Keeping Leaders Accountable
Keeping Leaders Accountable
by G. William Domhoff
People have lived under leader-dominated organizational structures since the rise of civilization. When it comes to power, civilizations are power pyramids, complete with a pecking order from top to bottom, and usually with no say-so for anyone below the very top. Everyday people are usually too divided among themselves and organizationally outflanked by their well-organized dominators to have any influence in very many places for very long. This nearly unbroken record of domination and subjugation is what makes the partial successes of democracy over the past 300 years so valuable and worth preserving. Building on those accomplishments, it is modern-day leftist egalitarians who have taken up the task of trying to opening up and flatten the power structures of modern-day societies.
However, the potential for domination by leaders remains a major problem even inside the egalitarian movements themselves. They, too, have a need for ways to keep leaders accountable and to elect new leaders if they are not to end up doing what they set out to undo. If anything, the need is all the greater because creating a new organization or climbing to a leadership role in an established organization can reinforce domination tendencies in any human being. Creating a new organization or rising to the top of an established one also can provide a new leader with the network of outside contacts, overall organizational understanding, and financial resources to gain complete control of the organization. Many years ago, a political scientist in Germany sadly concluded that "he who says organization says oligarchy." He formulated his pessimistic Iron Law of Oligarchy on the basis of his experience in the German Social Democratic Party, the largest and strongest socialist organization in Europe prior to World War I.
The sad story of how Cesar Chavez became an inflexible autocrat is recounted in another document on this site, but it is by no means an exceptional outcome. Consider what happened when Jesse Jackson created the Rainbow Coalition and ran for president in the 1984 and 1988 primaries, claiming that he wanted to build an organization that could challenge in the Democratic Party. It was the right idea and there was a good platform, but Jackson was the wrong person as far as creating an organization to transform the party. Thanks to his great charisma and eloquent speaking style, Jackson energized black voters, who used the opportunity of his candidacy to send the message that they wanted to have more power within the party. His overall vote total went from 18.5 percent in 1984 to 29.7 percent in 1988, with an improvement from 21 to 32 percent in Florida and from 9.8 to 37.6 in the very white state of Oregon.
Although his core vote was in the black community, Jackson won 30 percent of Hispanic votes and 12 percent of white votes in 1988. He may have received as many as 40 percent of the white vote in his upset victory in the Michigan caucuses in 1988. These vote totals are all the more impressive because of the problems he caused for himself because of his relationship with Black Muslim leader Louis Farrakan and his use of the term "hymie" to characterize Jews. Despite these and other mistakes, he won the fear and respect of Clinton and Gore in the 1988 primaries.
But he did not really try to build a lasting political organization that could be the base for an egalitarian wing in the party. Part of the problem was that he did not want to have to hassle with the various "New Communist Movement" organizations that had joined the Rainbow Coalition with the intention of taking it over and eventually splitting the Democratic Party so that a new left third party could arise. But an even more important problem was that he wanted to control everything and keep himself in the spotlight. He fought for progressive causes, but he did not delegate, follow through, or tolerate the success of any other potential leaders. In the 1988 campaign he drove away any notable person he saw as a possible rival and treated many members of his staff very badly, often scapegoating them for his own failures. It was not just Maoists and Trotskyists who were a problem in his eyes. His disappointed supporters drifted away and he used his Chicago-based civil rights organization, Rainbow/PUSH, to advance his personal agenda, frittering away whatever moral authority he had left. Jackson's campaigns once again suggest that working within the Democratic Party can have a real impact, but they also show the pitfalls of allowing an egotistical leader to control the campaign.
Lest the examples of Chavez and Jackson make the problem appear to be males, not organizational dynamics, it is instructive to look at the history of one of the more remarkable revolutionary Marxist groups of the 1970s, the Democratic Workers Party. It was distinguished from other such groups in two unique ways. It was led in good part by women, and it was not oriented toward the Soviet Union, China, or any other foreign revolution. Like the other revolutionary Marxist groups, however, it had few or no workers despite its name. In fact, it may have had the highest concentration of Ph.D.'s, M.D.'s, lawyers, and social workers of any political group in the country.
Despite its goals and the educational backgrounds of its most active members, it nonetheless became distinguished by the unchallenged power of its chair, a former sociology professor. As she settled into her role, and as her stature and self-importance grew, she became more and more outrageous and arbitrary. For example, she had members doing her housecleaning, and she maintained a luxurious lifestyle. She signed her name to articles and books written by others on topics about which she had little or no knowledge. There is also evidence that she used threats and intimidation to influence those who disagreed with her. Cars were spray painted, houses were ransacked, and the meetings of other leftists groups were disrupted.
After one or two years of intense work on party building, which expanded the group from a few dozen to several hundred, the chair and her closest associates on the central committee suddenly expelled several of those who helped found the party for having the wrong views, and then insisted that none of the members talk to them. Since party members often lived together in collectives, spent most of their time on party work, and had become close personal friends, this was a devastating penalty for differences of opinion. Most surprisingly, the members went along with the silence treatment, causing those who were expelled even greater personal isolation and anguish. After a 10-year effort that included community work, single-issue front organizations, and a third-party run for the governorship of California that received almost 50,000 votes, and cost the black Democratic candidate a victory, the members confessed their great despair to each other and finally rejected their leader, who was in any case talking about taking an elite few to Washington to start a leftist think tank.
Many of the members remained close social friends after the party project ended. Some of them apologized to those who had been treated badly while under expulsion, explaining that they felt guilty about their behavior, but believed they had to comply for the good of the party. Many prospered in their later careers, went back to graduate school and became professors, or worked for social service agencies. How could such decent, friendly, and intelligent people accept "party discipline" and behave so badly toward each other, not to mention how they treated other left activists?
In fact, the case of the Democratic Workers Party raises all the key problems of developing an egalitarian movement that does not succumb to the Iron Law of Oligarchy. Sadly, the party showed many of the characteristics that are typical of cult-like movements. As with cults, the members were normal people who wanted to be part of a project that would give more meaning to their lives. It was their willingness to sacrifice their personal lives for a cause they believed in that led them to endure the endless criticism that was part of being a member of the group. Many of them were somewhat younger than the chairwoman, which set her up as a respected adult figure. They admired her expertise and were proud to be part of the many study groups and research projects undertaken by the party. They felt part of an important in-group due to the secrecy with which the party operated, even to the point of adopting new "party" names that they used with each other. As with cults, the leader only gradually realized as the organization developed that she could demand more and more of the members without encountering resistance. As in cults, the members slowly found themselves doing things they did not really want to do, but they went along anyhow because they thought everyone else was in agreement. Furthermore, by then they had no place to turn because they had few friends or contacts outside the group.
Some of these worrisome problems concerning the headstrong nature of egalitarian leaders seem to have been present in the Nader presidential campaigns of 2000 and 2004. As his book on the 2000 campaign makes clear, he undertook the effort despite the fact that many of his closest activist associates refused to join him. He lists out their names, and has the nerve to chastise them for not living up to an earlier promise to support him if he ran for president. Then he remarks: "When I reminded them of that previous assurance, they said what they meant was if I ever ran as a Democrat." He apparently could not stop to realize that he may be off base if his co-workers of such long standing disagree with him about trying to start a third party. Come 2004, virtually none of the leading lights who had endorsed him in 2000 (e.g. Noam Chomsky, Frances Fox Piven, Barbara Ehrenreich, Howard Zinn) would support him again, but Nader rounded up a few young followers and ran anyhow.
Nor did Nader listen when those who did join him tried to give him advice in 2000 about the dry and lengthy nature of many of his speeches. Instead, he lectured them on how important it is to provide basic lessons in civics until people get it right. For all the talk about building an organization, it is clearly a one-man show when Nader goes on the road. By and large, he is surrounded by young people who want to be around him because of his shining reputation, but who are not in any position to give him honest feedback that he would accept.
Most troublesome of all, Nader may have kept his real motives from his followers in 2000. He may have been out to teach Gore a lesson for the disrespectful way he believed Gore had treated him in the previous few years. But that is not something he could say directly and win support from those who wanted to vote their consciences and stay clear of impure parties like the Democrats. In his book he almost says as much when he talks about the need for the Democrats to lose on occasion to keep them respectful of consumer and environmental activists. He certainly acted as if that was his real motive when he headed off to Miami to do last-minute campaigning in a state that everyone knew was too close to call, and in the face of the fact that some of his prominent supporters wanted him to demonstrate his clout by asking his supporters to vote for Gore in Florida.
Although Nader never publicly said that punishing Gore was his motive, that's the impression one disillusioned supporter received when he talked to a leader in the campaign about withdrawing from swing states like Florida, or asking Nader supporters in such states to hold their noses and vote for Gore in exchange for Nader votes by Democrats in safe states. The idea was that such a move would help defeat Bush while increasing the Nader vote in safe states. This would also vividly demonstrate the importance of Nader and his constituency to a Gore Administration and Democrats everywhere, or so some of his supporters reasoned. In response to this suggestion, one of Nader's top aides abruptly said "We are not going to do that." When the surprised supporter asked why not, the aide replied, "Because we want to punish the Democrats, we want to hurt them, wound them."
Whatever Nader's actual motives, the point is that he has as many serious weaknesses as a leader as Chavez, Jackson, and the chair of the Democratic Workers Party. All four are unresponsive and dominating figures who drew their eager supporters into trying to build organizations that failed in their stated purpose. How, then, can an egalitarian movement avoid these kinds of negative outcomes while at the same time having spokespersons who represent and spread the collective sense of "we-ness" by outlining the program and criticizing the corporate-conservative coalition? First, at the level of individual organizations, there has to be (1) a set of organizational rules that are ratified by the founding members; (2) an elected leadership council, and (3) the ability to replace the top leader or leaders by a vote of the membership. This is the "constitutionalism" emphasized by liberals and often ignored to their own peril by egalitarians. It is a necessity that also would narrow the gap between egalitarians and liberals. Furthermore, people who do not want to work or campaign in the context of these rules would not join, which would eliminate some potential dominators .
Second, the movement has to be made up of a network of organizations, not one big organization. This makes it less likely that a few top leaders will take over everything. It also gives individual activists more freedom because they can register their dissatisfaction by leaving one organization and joining another. This freedom helps to keep organizational leaders more responsive. In addition, a network of organizations is the best way to accommodate the multiple social identities that inevitably will be present in a movement based on a coalition of groups. In a network of organizations, there would be no pressure to abandon current social identities in favor of an overriding one required by one big hierarchical organization.
To keep the general movement on the pathways suggested in the other articles in this site, however, each organization would have to have the follow the three commitments essential to a network of egalitarian organizations: (1) working within the Democratic Party if and when the organization chooses to engage in partisan politics; (2) agreeing that strategic nonviolence is the only form of direct action that can be used by a social movement; and (3) using planning through the market if the organization chooses to develop any economic programs.
At the organizational level, the network would be coordinated to some extent by the many people in two or more groups, which has worked well for many different types of endeavors in the United States. Members of two or more organizations carry new ideas from organization to organization, tell organizations about potential new leaders they have worked with in other organizations, and much else. As now, the network would have some degree of coordination through articles on movement activities in progressive and left-wing publications . It also could be integrated through informal meetings of leaders, but it is probably best to avoid any formal organization consisting only of leaders. Such an organization of organizations can contribute to the development of hierarchy.
Within this shared context, the network is most specifically coordinated when any given organization goes to other organizations in the network to ask them to join a specific project. Other organizations need join only if they think the project is worthwhile. In this way, only projects that are widely accepted receive large-scale support. Such a process takes time and requires compromises, but it helps to keep the Iron Law of Oligarchy at bay.
The Egalitarian Democratic Clubs would be one part of this network. They would have the same kind of constitutions and follow the three commitments. They would have to convince other organizations in the network to join them in any given campaign within the Democratic Party. In essence, then, the network as a whole would decide when and where to move into electoral politics through the Egalitarian Democratic Clubs, which of course would have many members in common with the other organizations. The network would also generate its own candidates, not simply endorse the person who appears to be the best liberal or the most charismatic progressive in the race. Otherwise, the goal of creating a set of politicians who are responsible to the movement would be lost. So would the point of using campaigns as a way to build a clear picture of who is us and who is them. It also may be the case that members of the movement would only think of themselves as "egalitarians" when they are acting together in the political arena, which means that their other social identities would be salient most of the time.
Individual trade unions would be welcome to join the network if they so desired. Documents in this web site note the great importance of the "liberal-labor coalition" in American politics, especially in the Democratic Party, but I have not put great stress on unions when it comes to egalitarian social change because they must be seen as just one part of an overall picture, not the starting point or the key organization, as they often are for Marxist theorists. Many egalitarians would like to see unions take a more assertive political role in creating a more promising future for everyone who works for a salary or a wage, and they think that a primary focus on greater union organizing should be a major objective. However, unions more often than not function as "interest groups" that look out for their own members on issues concerning wages, hours, and working conditions. Moreover, and contrary to those who think renewed militancy is enough, it is very difficult to win organizing battles against corporations without major support from the government, as detailed historical case studies painfully reveal. Even when unions are already established, they cannot have a strong impact without a continuing alliance with a pro-union elected majority in the federal government.
Unions do play an important role in financing the Democratic Party, and could be very helpful to egalitarian Democrats if they donated money for primary challenges, but they have an overriding interest in maintaining access to elected Democrats, and to keeping some lines open to the Republicans. The AFL-CIO, as the umbrella group for most unions, may lend support for specific projects, and provide a symbolic presence or thousands of marchers for some demonstrations, but its generally liberal leadership is often constrained by the need to compromise with its most conventional and conservative member unions. This is especially the case for several of the building trades unions, which can be very conservative on some issues. Furthermore, unions represent only 12.5% of all workers, and just 7.9% of privately employed workers as of 2004, and the density in the public section even declined from 37.2% in 2003 to 36.4% in 2004. So, even though many specific unions may be an important part of the network on some issues, few of them are likely to play an active part in creating an egalitarian movement. It may be necessary to have union support eventually to go very far, but it would not be wise to wait until they are ready to start the ball rolling.
Once there are organizations working together that share the three commitments, the general movement then can grow through (1) the addition of new members to existing organizations or (2) adding new organizations. New organizations are accepted if and only if they have the three commitments built into their rules.
Are there examples of such a structure? In fact, this abstract outline is more or less a summary of how the living-wage and anti-sweatshop campaigns have been carried out. They are movements based on a variety of independent organizations that have decided to work together. The living-wage initiative, which calls on city and county governments to do business only with companies that pay what is necessary for a minimum standard of living in the area, is the product of a neighborhood organizing group, ACORN, and a service-industry union, SEIU. ACORN and SEIU have drawn churches, civil rights groups, women's organizations, and some unions into many dozens of local coalitions, which led to 79 victories between 1994 and early 2002.
Anti-sweatshop campaigns were first of all the creation of campus-based organizations that demand that the university jackets, sweatshirts, and other apparel sold in campus stores be made by companies that pay living wages. They were started by student organizers who were trained by the AFL-CIO through its student-oriented institute called Union Summer, and they often draw in local unions and other grassroots organizations. Some anti-sweatshop groups also have branched out to fight for living wages for the service personnel on their campuses, which often means further union involvement. Using research, media presentations, picketing, sit-ins, boycotts, and hunger strikes, they have been successful on dozens of campus across the country since they began in 1997.
The organizations in these two separate, but overlapping movements do not have the three commitments built into their rules, but those rules are implicit in what they do. First, they have not tried to start third parties, usually preferring to work in nonpartisan politics at the local level if they enter into electoral politics at all. Second, the very fact that the living-wage campaigns demand a "living wage" for those working for companies doing business with the government is an example of planning through the market. Third, these campaigns are nonviolent. Thus, it would be easy for the organizations in the living-wage and anti-sweatshop campaigns to build the three commitments into their rules.
The feminist movement also has a highly decentralized and networked structure that starts with small support groups, turns to local-level projects, and comes together in nationwide organizations like NOW. The local groups do not control NOW, and NOW does not control the local groups, although it has local chapters. In effect, the organizations in the feminist network adhere to the three commitments, which is one reason for their successes. They have been loathe to advocate third parties, and their victories within the Democratic Party have created tensions within the Republican Party on abortion and affirmative action, and forced the Republicans to support more women candidates, albeit conservative women. Then, too, the movement believes in government planning through the market, as shown by its support of affirmative action and anti-discrimination laws. Most of its members also believe that the government has to support child care, social security, and their right to choose if they are going to be able to advance in their careers without taking time out to stay at home with young children, care for aging parents, or complete an unexpected pregnancy.
The global justice movement also has a decentralized type of structure, reflecting the anti-authoritarian thrust of the movement. However, the rejection of any formal rules by most organizations involved in street demonstrations, and their emphasis on "direct democracy," where everyone speaks and there are no regularly elected leaders, makes them vulnerable to control through a combination of charisma and persistence. If the experiences of the late 1960s are any indication, they may come to suffer from a "tyranny of structurelessness," which leads to invisible hierarchies and informal power structures that are somewhat masked by the claim that there are no leaders. There are indications that his happened with some groups in the run-up to the "battle of Seattle." In addition, the global justice movement has gone back and forth over the issue of including property damage as a part of direct action.
So, the basic structures are already there in the living wage, anti-sweatshop, and feminist movements for a non-hierarchical egalitarian movement. They are also potentially present in the global justice movement if it could accept the need for leadership accountability and an exclusive focus on nonviolent direct action. (As things now stand, however, the global justice movement is not likely to become part of a larger egalitarian movement because it has opted for direct democracy and a diversity of tactics, which are likely to prove both self-limiting and self-defeating.)
The success of the living-wage, anti-sweatshop, and feminist movements is demonstrated by the fact that they do not feature any big names who hog the limelight, as happened with organizations of the New Left. The main reason they have not created a nationwide network, I believe, is that most people do not want to be caught up in the highly divisive issues that are addressed by the three commitments. They do not want to hassle with Green Party enthusiasts, so they often avoid anything that smacks of partisan politics, with the exception of feminist groups, who work judiciously in the Democratic Party for their goals. Nor do any of these groups want to enter into lengthy arguments about socialism with those who define themselves as socialists or revolutionary Marxists, so they usually avoid large umbrella coalitions where revolutionary Marxist groups like ANSWER or the International Socialist Organization might gain a big role. Furthermore, they do not want to find themselves part of demonstrations or projects that involve people or groups who may decide to damage property or provoke the police, so they stay home.
In short, people don't want to end up trapped by bullies, egotists, and power trippers, and they understand the Iron Law of Oligarchy. The organizational framework suggested in this document is therefore aimed at dealing with these problems through (1) adopting standard accountability mechanisms within organizations and (2) adopting the three commitments. If these suggestions lead to organizations that proved to be open, durable, and safe, many more people might feel comfortable in joining an egalitarian movement.
For the classic statement of the Iron Law of Oligarchy, see Robert Michels, Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1915. For modern statements of the inevitability of elites within organizations for organizational reasons, not genetic or psychological ones, see John Higley and G. Lowell Fields, Elitism Boston : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980; and in a short and very accessible form, Michael Burton and John Higley, "Invitation to elite theory: The basic contentions," pp. 219-238 in G. William Domhoff and Thomas R. Dye, editors, Power Elites and Organizations, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987.
For the problems of Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers, see Theo J. Majka and Linda C. Majka, "Decline of the farm labor movement in California: Organizational crisis and political change," Critical Sociology, 19, 1992, pp. 3-36. For a public statement of Chavez's failings by one of his former lawyers, see Jerome Cohen, "UFW must get back to organizing, " Los Angeles Times, Jan. 15, 1986, page 5. Cohen notes that Chavez blames the conservative Republican governor who was elected in 1982 for his problems, but then writes that "As farm labor election statistics prove, the union stopped organizing effectively before Dukmejian became governor in 1982." He goes on to say that "here we should render unto Cesar what is Cesar's, namely, the responsibility for the UFW's failure as yet to fulfill its promise." My account also builds on conversations with Cohen, and also with William H. Friedland, one of the leading experts on farm workers in the United States.
For the voting figures from the 1984 and 1988 campaigns, see Frank Clemente and Frank Watkins, Keep hope alive: Jesse Jackson's 1988 presidential campaign, Boston, South End Press, 1989, page 233ff.. For comments on the limitations of Jesse Jackson and his 1984 campaign, see Manning Marable, "Jackson and the Rise of the Rainbow," New Left Review, 149, 1985, 3-44; and Sheila D. Collins, The rainbow challenge: The Jackson campaign and the future of U.S. politics, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986. For an account of the chaotic 1988 campaign, which shows Jackson's need to monopolize all media appearances, and to denigrate any staff members who have connections outside the campaign, see the analysis by his former press secretary, journalist Elizabeth O. Colton, The Jackson Phenomenon, New York: Doubleday, 1989. On the lack of organization in his Rainbow Coalition, see Jamin B. Raskin, "Rainbow signs," The Nation, 253, July 1, 1991, pp. 4-6. For evidence that Jackson did not do a good job of building organizations because of the conflict between his charismatic style and the needs of an organization, see the balanced account by Ernest R. House, Jesse Jackson and the politics of charisma: The rise and fall of the PUSH/Excel program, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, Chapters 10, 11, and 13.
For the story of the Democratic Workers Party, and an excellent account of how many different types of groups can become cult-like if they are not careful, see Janja Lalich, Bounded choice: True believers and charismatic cults, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. For another fine analysis of how seemingly leaderless egalitarian organizations come to be dominated by charismatic leaders, see Richard J. Ellis, The dark side of the left, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998, Chapter 6; and Jo Freeman, "The tyranny of structurelessness," Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 17, 1972-1973, pp. 151-164.
Ralph Nader, Crashing the party, New York: St. Martin's Press 2002, pp. 57-58, for the list of colleagues that Nader criticizes for not serving as his campaign manager, and for the claim that they would have supported him if he ran as a Democrat. For the story about the Nader aide who said the goal was to punish Gore, I relied upon the first-person account by Harry Levine, an outstanding sociologist. See his assertion that Nader was out to sink Gore at www.hereinstead.com.
To understand why the role of unions in the liberal-labor coalition is so complex, see William Form, Divided we stand: Working-class stratification in America, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985; and William Form, Segmented labor, fractured politics: Labor politics in American life, New York: Plenum Press, 1995. For a critique of most unions as not doing a good enough job of organizing, see Kate Bronfenbrenner, Changing to organize: Unions know what has to be done," The Nation, 273, Sept 3, 2001, page 16-19. For a somewhat different view of the problems facing unions, see the reply in the same issue by Nelson Lichtenstein, page 29.
To understand the necessity of government protection in order to make unionization possible, see Kim Voss, The making of American exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and class formation in the nineteenth century, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; and Sidney Fine, Sit-down: The General Motors strike of 1936-1937, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1969.
For an account of the living wage campaigns, see Jim Hightower, "Campaign for a living wage," The Nation, April 1, 2002, page 8. For organizational conflicts in the anti-sweatshop movement, see Liza Featherstone, "The Student Movement Comes of Age," The Nation, 271, Oct 16, 2000, pp. 23-25, and Liza Featherstone, Students Against Sweatshops, New York: Verso, 2002.
For the organizational structure of the feminist movement, one excellent source is Ruth Rosen, The world split open: How the modern women's movement changed America, New York: Viking Press, 2000. I do not want to imply that there were no tensions within and among these organizations, but my stress here is on the general network structure. For a discussion of the origins and tensions in this network, see Jo Freeman, "The origins of the women's liberation movement," American Journal of Sociology, 78, 1973, pp. 792-811
For the problems of invisible hierarchy in the global justice movement, see Yuen, "Introduction," page 10, in The Battle of Seattle, New York: Soft Skull Press, 2001. In the same book, see also Stephanie Guilloud, "Spark, fire, and burning coals: An organizer's history of Seattle," pp. 229-230. In this context, it is also useful to recall once again Freeman, "The tyranny of structurelessness," op. cit. Freeman points out that a lack of formal organizational structure can become a way of masking power, which can be all the more arbitrary because of the claim that it is not being exercised. This is why formal controls on leadership are essential to a "liberal egalitarianism," as stressed by Ellis, The dark side of the left, op. cit.
For the role of revolutionary Marxists from the Trotskyist-oriented International Socialist Organization (ISO) in the anti-war protests of 2002, see Liza Featherstone, "The mideast war breaks out on campus," The Nation, June 17, 2002, pp. 18-21. For a comment on the role of the Stalinist Workers World Party and its front group, ANSWER, in the global justice movement, see L. A. Kauffman, "All has changed," Free Radical, No. 19, September 19, 2002.
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