

SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND – TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY NETWORKS AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AMAZÔNIA

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ABSTRACT

The success of internationally-driven efforts to promote local environmentally sustainable development (ESD) depends on grassroots groups' and local organizations' ability to take the lead in the process of defining the concept of ESD and the strategies to implement it. This argument is substantiated in this article through the analysis of the challenges and opportunities that confronted local grassroots groups in Rondônia, a Brazilian Amazon state that became the site of a World Bank-funded natural resources management initiative in the late 1980s (the Planaflo project). The article describes how different approaches to ESD, sponsored by different stakeholders at different junctures of the Planaflo's implementation, have affected the overall performance of the project and its environmental impact. The article focuses on the role played by Rondonian civil society groups in restructuring the Planaflo project to finance a fund for community initiatives, and discusses the impact of such grassroots-based development initiatives on Rondônia's environment.

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The importance of including civil society groups and grassroots organizations in transnational initiatives to promote environmental sustainable development (ESD) has been widely acknowledged by development agencies, social scientists, and environmentalists (World Bank 2000, Veit et al. 1995, Pasong and Lebel 2000). The lessons illuminating this consensus derive mostly from ESD experiments that have involved either specific communities (neighborhood associations, village councils, farmers cooperatives), or specific sectors of the population (women, the urban poor, indigenous peoples). In these cases, the level of homogeneity of perceptions, interests, and expectations among the target-group or population facilitates the formulation of a common approach to ESD and to the best ways of achieving it. But to what extent can policymakers successfully determine and implement environmentally sustainable development policies for an entire state? What happens when the intended beneficiaries of such policies belong to various sectors of the population, each attributing different values to environmental protection? What are the consequences of creating a participatory space for organizations representing and/or supporting beneficiaries within the larger decisionmaking structure of a given development initiative? How does beneficiaries' participation affect the conceptualization and the implementation of ESD policies? Finally, what happens when the participation of civil society organizations and grassroots associations unfolds in a context affected by their political alliances and institutional connections with other actors with stakes in the development initiative and by their material and technical dependence on some of these actors?

The challenges of establishing a common approach to ESD and to the strategies for implementing it among the participants of a transnational development initiative are the focus of this study. The analysis of the World Bank-funded Planaflo project, implemented in the Brazilian Amazon state of Rondônia from 1993 to 2000 (expected to be extended until 2001) illustrates these challenges. Since its inception, the Planaflo project was perceived as an opportunity to compensate for the negative environmental consequences of previous development initiatives in the region (Rich 1994, Oliveira 1998). The Planaflo's main objective was "...to implement an improved approach to natural resource management, conservation and development in the state of Rondônia..."¹ A key instrument in achieving this goal was the formulation of a socio-economic and environmental zoning plan to serve as the foundation of a Zoning Law to regulate the use of the state's natural resources. Finally, the Planaflo contained a series of specific conditions and pre-conditions such as the participation of Rondônia's civil society in the project's decisionmaking bodies, the creation of extractive reserves, the effective demarcation and protection of Amerindian lands and conservation units, the elimination of deforestation as a criterion for land titling, and the development of critical studies aiming at making state and federal tax and credit incentives compatible to Planaflo's goals.

The Planaflo project, as it was initially conceived, reflected the approaches to ESD held by the actors most directly involved in its design. These were the World Bank project team (a group that contained highly skilled and committed environmentalists), consultants for the United Nations Development Program, and Brazilian/Rondonian government officials. To a certain extent, the Planaflo initial design also included the views and expectations of a coalition of non-governmental actors who had monitored the preparation of the project and were concerned with Rondônia's ESD. The approach to ESD that prevailed in the Planaflo project prioritized the protection of areas of high ecological and biodiversity value as well as of those necessary for the physical and cultural survival of forest peoples (indigenous peoples and rubber-tappers). The zoning process and the strengthening of the institutional capacity of Rondônia's environmental agencies were the key mechanisms to accomplish and sustain these goals.² Arguably, the approach to ESD that prevailed in the Planaflo's initial design could be defined as "conservationist" (McCormick 1989) or "mainstream" (Lélé 1991).³

Opposition by local economic interests and the lack of both political will and administrative and technical skills compromised the implementation of Planaflo's environmental components from the project's inception. Keck (1998) highlights the "remarkable disjunction" between the views and expectations about the Planaflo project.⁴ In the end, those concerned with implementing the environmental and social aspects of Planaflo, i.e.; local civil society organizations and their international allies were "neutralized"

by the dynamics of local politics. Local NGOs and social movements were not only structurally weak but also did not fully understand Rondônia's political game. As a result they were incapable of insulating Planaflo's decisionmaking processes from Rondônia's pork barrel politics. Millikan (1998) adds another layer to Keck's explanation, arguing that the lack of technical capacity of both governmental agencies and local NGOs and social movements was at the root of Planaflo's implementation crisis. One of Planaflo's premises was that the project would establish co-management institutions between governmental agencies and civil society organizations. While the dynamics of Rondônia's politics contributed to make these institutions inoperative, this outcome was also the result of the "internal limitations" of Rondonian civil society organizations.⁵

Keck's and Millikan's insightful explanations for Planaflo's implementation shortcomings overlook the puzzle presented by the existence of a powerful coalition of international and Brazilian environmental organizations and activists, and the political and material resources that it has deployed to guarantee the implementation of Planaflo's environmental components. What role has such a coalition played in fostering – or hindering – Planaflo's environmental goals? How has its approach to ESD and to the strategies to pursue it affected the project's implementation? I will argue that Planaflo's successes and shortcomings are as much functions of Rondônia's political and institutional contexts as they are of the challenges and opportunities that derived from the transnational coalition of non-governmental actors that mobilized around it. I called this type of coalitions Environmental Protection Issue Networks (EPINs) (Rodrigues 2000).⁶

A key challenge that EPINs face is to formulate an operational definition of ESD. The diversity of actors within an EPIN guarantees a diversity of approaches to ESD that often compromises the network's effectiveness. Local populations in the developing world tend to perceive ESD as a welcome *consequence* of processes of improving their political participation and productive capacity (Little 1994, Strum 1994, Nagpal 1998). This approach, however, sometimes contrasts with the priorities of ESD initiatives fostered by major international actors concerned with development and environmental issues. The World Bank, for instance, defines ESD in terms of "protection of the world's physical and ecological systems;" the USAID's emphasis is on the "efficient use of resources;" international environmental think tanks, such as the World Resources Institute, states its commitment to protecting the Earth's environment, while the mission statements of international environmental NGOs such as the Environmental Defense and Friends of the Earth are defined in terms of "securing environmental rights" and "preserving the health and diversity of the planet for future generations."⁷ It is my contention that an EPIN's effectiveness is affected by the extent to which it allows for grassroots groups and local organizations participating in it *to play a leadership role* in the process of determining what ESD means (or should mean) in their region and how to implement it.

In this paper I will demonstrate that the Planaflo EPIN,⁸ in its initial stages, was under the predominant influence of international NGOs, who functioned as the network's catalysts.⁹ Although skeptical of Planaflo's capacity to promote ESD in Rondônia, the EPIN affected the project design, doing so mostly from a "conservationist" perspective (the EPIN prioritized the protection of indigenous lands, creation of extractive reserves and conservation units, and policy proposals to eliminate deforestation in the state). As the EPIN evolved, however, and its local membership base assumed the catalyst role for the network's actions, its approach to ESD in the context of the Planaflo project was redefined. Such a redefinition reflected a compromise between different sectors of the Rondonian population, who competed for a variety of natural resources. It also reflected the aspirations to political participation and economic improvement of the Rondonian civil society. The Planaflo's *Programa de Apoio a Iniciativas Comunitárias* (Program for the Support of Community Initiatives, PAIC), one of the outcomes of the Planaflo's restructuring process in 1996, illustrates how the Planaflo EPIN has recently redefined its approach to ESD. This conceptual redefinition and the lessons it entails may have important contributions to the formulation of a viable path to Rondônia's environmentally sound development and to increased grassroots participation in this process.

The need to address the contribution of the “local level” in multi-level efforts to promote global ESD is widely recognized. Lipschutz (1997) emphasizes the importance of global alliances, coalitions, and networks in bringing the approaches of local actors into the environmental protection and management efforts (“governance”) of transnational and international organizations. For the author, the mediation of global civil society actors is key to make local knowledge and local “social meaning” a part of global environmental governance processes. These processes’ effectiveness depends on a successful negotiation of the “terms of the story,” the “meaning,” of the environmental protection initiative. Lipschutz’s purpose, however, is to highlight the theoretical importance of local knowledge and participation. He leaves up to other researchers to provide empirical data on how the various actors in a environmental coalition may negotiate and find consensus on the meaning of a given environmental protection effort.

Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) seminal work on transnational networks provides a clear picture of some of the most significant multi-level efforts at global (environmental) governance. While acknowledging the importance of building a strong local constituency, their analysis focuses on the role of international NGOs in these networks. The contribution of international NGOs derives from their skillfulness in pursuing strategies such as public information production and dissemination, lobbying of key international agencies, and “accountability politics,” i.e, pressuring states and international organizations to be accountable to their official discourses.

Outside the scope of global environmental governance research, empirical studies have also addressed the role of local groups, particularly in internationally-initiated efforts to promote forest conservation management. For Banerjee et al. (1995), the first condition for local groups’ participation is the government’s commitment to participatory management. True as a rule, this approach precludes the investigation of instances where local groups and their international allies were able to impose participatory management schemes on a reluctant local government. Rudel (2000) acknowledges the effect of local politics on environmentally sustainable development initiatives. He suggests the creation of “civic arenas,” where all stakeholders in a given policy or resource pool would come together “to negotiate the trade-offs that permit sustainable development in a region” (Rudel 2000, p. 78). Rudel’s suggestion, however, applies to situations where different stakeholders (local, national, and international) compete for a single resource (forest or water, for instance). It is not clear how effective civic arenas would be in fostering a common understanding about environmentally sustainable development among different stakeholders competing, at once, for a broad range of resources (forest, land, minerals, water).

The EPIN framework that I use in this study addresses some of the gaps in the literature discussed above. It requires a focus on the contribution of local organizations and grassroots groups to the success of internationally-driven initiatives to promote ESD. By looking at the internal dynamics of EPINs, how their members define issues and distribute resources among themselves, one can better understand the impact of transnational advocacy networks on the “local level.” In the case discussed here, the EPIN mobilized in the context of the Planaflo project had significant impacts on both Rondonian natural and political environments. In the following section, I describe the strategies that the Planaflo EPIN used to affect the Planaflo design and their consequences. In Part II, I describe the evolution of the Planaflo EPIN, focusing on how the rise of Rondônia’s advocacy groups and grassroots movements to the position of network catalysts has forced the EPIN to reformulate its approach to ESD. This reformulation has affected the demands, strategies, and resources of the Planaflo EPIN and, as a consequence, its contribution to Rondônia’s natural and political environments.

Data for this research were obtained from approximately thirty open-ended interviews conducted in two stages (1993/4 and 2000), with World Bank officials involved in the Planaflo’s design, implementation, and restructuring processes, representatives of international and Brazilian environmental and human rights NGOs who monitored the project, representatives of Rondônia-based NGOs, grassroots groups, and federation of industries, consultants for both the World Bank and the Rondonian civil society groups, and government officials of state and federal agencies in charge of project implementation.¹⁰ In addition to

interviews, I obtained data from the World Bank's and the Brazilian Government's official documents on the Planaflo Project, such as the Loan Agreement and evaluation reports on project implementation, transcription of speeches and interventions of Rondonian politicians in the Brazilian Congress and in the Rondônia's Legislative Assembly, evaluation reports by independent consultants, letters, petitions, and detailed documentation produced by international, Brazilian, and Rondonian NGOs and grassroots groups denouncing Planaflo's conceptual and implementation flaws, newspapers' articles, and Planaflo's manuals and financial reports.

Environmental Protection, Civil Society Participation, and Economic Development: The Planaflo EPIN Searches for Common Ground (1988 – 1994)

From its inception in 1988, when preparations for the Planaflo project began, until 1993-4, when project implementation was underway, the Planaflo EPIN influenced the initiative in two major ways. First, it lobbied the World Bank and the Brazilian federal government to establish environmental pre-conditions to the project funding. Second, it pressured these same actors to constrain the environmentally unsound actions of the Brazilian colonization agency in Rondônia. The Planaflo pre-conditions and the effort to avoid further colonization projects in Rondônia aimed at limiting deforestation in the region while protecting local populations whose livelihoods depended on the forest (namely indigenous peoples and rubber-tappers). These goals were determined mostly by international environmental NGOs and activists familiar with the region, by World Bank environmentalists who supported their concerns, and by Brazilian research and advocacy organization committed to the environmental protection of the Amazon region. Selected Rondônia's civil society organizations, such as the Catholic Church's advocacy agencies for indigenous peoples (CIMI) and landless rural workers (CPT), and local environmental research institutes (IPHAE, ECOPORÉ, INDIA) supported these actions, but took a "back seat" in formulating and pursuing them.

As I will demonstrate in the paragraphs below, while the Planaflo EPIN eventually accomplished a few of its initial goals, it was incapable of attaining most of them, at least until the mid-1990s. In addition, its inability to fully assimilate the expectations of Rondônia's grassroots groups affected by the Planaflo project caused it to face a legitimacy crisis in 1994.

The Planaflo EPIN and the Protection of Rondônia's Ecosystems

The coalition of foreign researchers, Brazilian research organizations, and international environmental NGOs that came together to monitor the preparation of the Planaflo project was bound by its members' previous experience with the Polonoroeste project, a development initiative also funded by the World Bank in Rondônia between 1982 and 1987. Hoping to avoid a reenactment of the Polonoroeste's disastrous environmental record, this coalition organized a series of strategies to force both the World Bank and the Rondonian government to be accountable to the Planaflo's stated environmental objectives. The fact that the Planaflo EPIN was originally composed of actors who were instrumental in making the Polonoroeste project the showcase of the Multilateral Development Banks Campaign (the MDB Campaign), inevitable constrained the network's initial steps.¹¹

These constraints are easily identified once one analyzes both the nature of the demands of the Planaflo EPIN, and the strategies it devised to influence the Planaflo's design. The Planaflo EPIN's initial demands emphasized the need to implement the still unmet Polonoroeste's environmental protection measures. A letter and related documentation sent by the Environmental Defense Fund to the US Executive Director to the World Bank, Patrick Coady, in January 9, 1990, demanded the "prompt execution of still pending measures required in the 1981 Polonoroeste loan agreement..." i.e., Brazilian authorities needed to regularize the situation of fifteen Amerindian reserves and four conservation units, whose protection had been determined by the Polonoroeste project.

The strategies used by the Planaflo EPIN to influence the project design unfolded within the framework established by the campaign against the multilateral banks. National NGOs and research institutes¹² as well as fact-finding missions from international NGOs, produced information about the impact that the Planaflo's preparation on Rondônia's environment. Information was then circulated among network members and concerned media, and summarized in letters to World Bank officials and the Brazilian and Rondonian governments. Meetings between EPIN members and World Bank officials, when the EPIN's concerns were reiterated, usually followed this correspondence. In addition, international NGOs sponsored visits from Brazilian environmentalists (Chico Mendes) and indigenous leaders (Ailton Krenak), to Washington D.C., when they indicated to World Bank officials and US Congress representatives their opposition to the Planaflo's original design.

Eventually the World Bank Board of Directors approved the Planaflo project despite the fact that most project pre-conditions had not been implemented. At best, the Planaflo EPIN succeeded in engineering a formal agreement (*Protocolo de Entendimento*) between Rondônia's local NGOs and the state government in 1991. In it, the latter committed to be responsive to Planaflo's environmental provisions, namely, the protection of extractive reserves and indigenous areas; the prevention of land titling and settlement initiatives, logging, and mining in these areas; the creation of a support program for rubber-tapper communities; the elimination of deforestation as a criterion for determining land titling; and the commitment to strengthening Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for productive activities in the state (*Protocolo de Entendimento*, item 8).

By the end of Planaflo's first year of implementation, an independent monitoring report¹³ acknowledged that studies were underway for the demarcation of extractive reserves and the provision of infrastructure in them. Yet, invasions remained in indigenous areas affected by the project and their demarcation was problematic in many cases. For instance, final demarcation of the indigenous area Urueu-wau-wau had not occurred, despite the fact that it had been a condition of the Polonoroeste project and a pre-condition of Planaflo. The focus of the independent evaluation, however, was on the actions of the Brazilian colonization agency, the *Instituto de Colonização e Reforma Agrária, INCRA*, which refused to eliminate deforestation as a criterion for land titling, conduct appropriate EIAs, and abide by zoning regulations when planning new settlement projects in the state.¹⁴

Between 1992 and 1993, the Planaflo EPIN focused its efforts on curbing INCRA's actions. It did that through formal appeals to Brazilian authorities and to the World Bank¹⁵ and by initiating a court action against the agency. In early 1994, a court ruling forbade the colonization institute to pursue its plans. The institute initially refused to comply and was forced to pay heavy fines. Eventually, the colonization institute abandoned the plans for the settlement projects. Constraining INCRA's actions, the formal demarcation of a small number of extractive reserves, and a preliminary formulation of a program for the state's support of rubber-tapper communities were Planaflo's only environmentally related measures accomplished by the mid-1990s.

Chico Mendes' involvement in the Planaflo EPIN's initial stages, the strength and political visibility that the Brazilian rubber-tapper movement acquired after he was murdered, and the technical knowledge that many international environmental NGOs had on the issue were important resources. They help explaining the EPIN's moderate level of accomplishment regarding extractive reserves. The intense national and international lobby against the actions of the Brazilian colonization agency, and the 1993 court action were crucial to constrain at least some of the agency's role in Rondônia's deforestation. These results reflected the EPIN's emphasis on forest conservation, which had been determined by the network catalysts, i.e., international NGOs such as Oxfam, Survival International, and the Environmental Defense Fund. While the network's Brazilian and Rondonian partners shared these priorities, they were seen with suspicion by segments of Planaflo's beneficiaries, such as small agricultural workers. In addition, some of the strategies that the EPIN pursued to promote Planaflo's conservationist goals were not entirely endorsed by many grassroots groups in Rondônia. In the paragraphs below I discuss participation issues in the Planaflo EPIN and the implications they have had for the participation of

Rondonian civil society organizations in determining environmentally sustainable development policies in the state.

The Planaflo EPIN and Civil Society Participation in Rondônia

The Planaflo EPIN's formative actors were, from the beginning, acutely aware of the importance of investing legitimacy to their actions by securing the support of local actors. International NGOs and activists who monitored the Polonoeste project in the context of the multilateral development banks campaign had been, at times, questioned on the legitimacy of their actions by sectors of the Brazilian government and media, and by MDB officials. They were charged with being "outsiders" to the region and not representing the interests of local populations.¹⁶

The concerns of EPIN members with the network's legitimacy were justified. For instance, thirty-six individuals, representing environmental and human rights NGOs, research institutes, and political parties from twelve different countries signed the 1990 letter by the Environmental Defense Fund to Coady mentioned above. Although seven Brazilian organizations co-signed the letter, only one was actually located in Rondônia.¹⁷ Maybe in anticipation that its demands regarding the Planaflo project could be counteracted by challenges to its legitimacy, the Planaflo EPIN members initiated a concerted effort to raise awareness about the risks of the project among Rondônia's NGOs and grassroots groups. Between January and May, 1990, the Environmental Defense Fund forwarded to the World Bank copious evidence that the concerns voiced by international environmental NGOs were shared by Rondônia's groups.¹⁸ In addition, it encouraged Rondonian NGOs to mobilize political and material resources for monitoring the Planaflo. In fact, in an e-mail to the Environmental Defense Fund, the staff of the Rondonian NGO IPHAE cheers the opportunity that Planaflo may bring to Rondônia's civil society groups: "If Rondônia ever needed an issue to catalyze the NGOs into a movement, it just might be this."

In addition to their legitimacy concerns, international environmental NGOs believed that the direct involvement of local organizations in Planaflo's implementation and monitoring institutions was necessary if environmental measures were to be taken seriously by the Rondonian state. An analysis of the strategies used by the Planaflo EPIN to increase local participation in the project's management suggests that the network's catalysts may have perceived a need for local groups to play the role of "watchdogs" to Planaflo's environmental components. As such, the ideals of environmental protection and civil society participation in the context of the Planaflo project, although complementary, were distinct EPIN goals. Later in this paper I discuss how the process of formulating the Planaflo's Program for Community Initiatives and some of its results offer lessons on integrating these two ideals.

The Planaflo EPIN's main strategies to promote local participation in the context of the Planaflo project were to promote meetings with local organizations to share information about the project, to encourage and finance the creation of a local umbrella organization that soon became the major interlocutor for the EPIN's concerns on Planaflo, and to pressure for the inclusion of local organizations in the project's management institutions.

In November 1990, international NGOs sponsored a meeting in Porto Velho, Rondônia, for local groups to discuss the Planaflo project. The meeting was important for two reasons. First, it became a landmark in the process of mobilizing Rondonian NGOs and grassroots organizations. Second, it lent international visibility to local organizations, mainly vis-à-vis the World Bank. As a result, the latter supported Rondonian local groups when they demanded, in a meeting with the state government, the status of Planaflo's co-managers. The 1991 agreement ("*Protocolo de Entendimento*") between the NGOs¹⁹ and the government formalized the participation of local groups in the project. It determined that they would participate, together with representative of state agencies, in a decisionmaking body in charge of deliberating on Planaflo's critical issues (*Conselho Deliberativo*). Local groups would also have a say in the planning and budgeting of specific Planaflo-related initiatives to be carried out by governmental agencies.

In the wake of the June 1991 meeting, Rondônia civil society groups created an umbrella organization, the *Forum de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais de Rondônia* (Forum of Rondônia's NGOs and Social Movements, or the Rondônia Forum) that quickly became, at least formally, the major "voice" of the Planaflo EPIN. Perceptions on the role, political weight, and legitimacy of the Rondônia Forum in its first two years of existence varied widely. For some, it became an arena for the aggregation of interests and strategies of collective action for Rondonian groups who shared a common vision of Rondônia's development. As such, the Forum was, from its inception, politically strong in its negotiations with the World Bank (but not with the Rondonian government, a capacity that it acquired only much later, as I will demonstrate in the next section).²⁰ For others, the Rondônia Forum was a space through which local NGOs could coordinate their actions vis-à-vis the Planaflo project and Rondônia's ESD policies. It did not represent, however, a space for Rondonian grassroots groups and social movements. This meant that the Rondônia Forum was a valid, yet not sufficient, interlocutor of the expectations of the Rondonian civil society toward Planaflo.²¹ Others yet saw the Rondônia Forum as a reference for external actors, namely international environmental NGOs and the World Bank. The organization, in its inception, had little representation among local grassroots groups and operated within a pre-established framework (that provided by the campaign against the Multilateral Development Banks). But even these observers noted that, for certain Rondonian groups, the Forum was a valid resource in their struggle for citizenship.²²

Between 1991 and 1994 the Rondônia Forum fulfilled its mandate in two ways, which were often contradictory. On the one hand, its limited staff struggled to meet the demands of participating in Planaflo's co-management institutions and of providing primary technical support for other Rondonian groups that also occupied seats in the *Conselho Deliberativo*. On the other hand, the Forum's activists documented the government's mismanagement of Planaflo, and shared this information with domestic and international audiences in the format of letters to Brazilian and World Bank authorities, "open letters" to the international environmental community, and articles in the local, national, and international media. Both strategies had implications for the Rondônia Forum's long-term legitimacy vis-à-vis its constituency, i.e., Rondonian grassroots groups and social movements.

According to Millikan (1998), neither the Forum, nor its member organizations had the technical capacity to assume the level of responsibility that they did in the context of the *Conselho Deliberativo*. The organizations "wore themselves too thin" trying to play, at once, the roles of co-managers and "watchdogs" for the project. The lack of capacity of the Rondonian civil society groups also contributed to the erosion of their legitimacy vis-à-vis their bases. The participation of Rondonian civil society organizations in Planaflo's decisionmaking institutions raised expectations among the project's beneficiaries that were never fulfilled.

By 1994, two years after the project was approved, and more than six since its first version prepared, the Planaflo environmental provisions remained on paper. Frustrations reached a peak level particularly among rubber-tappers²³ and certain indigenous groups. In interviews with the author, Antenor Karintiana, leader of the Karintiana indigenous people, stated that "Planaflo has promised a lot to the indians, but it hasn't done anything," while José M. dos Santos, OSR's Vice-President, explained that "Planaflo's delay in establishing extractive reserves has led to the discredit of the rubber-tappers' movement."²⁴ In fact, the Rondônia's Forum role in co-managing Planaflo's implementation constituted a "political trap." As Keck (1998) explains, by including civil society groups in Planaflo's "official" decision-making institutions, Rondonian political elites cast local NGOs in an internationally (and locally) visible political role but one that was merely symbolic. When it came to playing Planaflo's "actual" decision-making game, NGOs remained irrelevant.

The strategy of being a "watchdog" for Planaflo, mainly by denouncing the project mismanagement to the World Bank (in anticipation that the latter would pressure the Rondonian government towards adequate implementation), was also problematic. Its greatest advantage was that it contributed to increasing the Forum's visibility in domestic and international arenas. Its disadvantage was that it often

accentuated the cleavages within the Rondônia Forum's coalition and within the Planaflores EPIN as a whole. The Forum's emphasis on making the World Bank its primary audience for criticisms of the Planaflores project and its tendency to use the Bank's monitoring teams as mediators in its power struggle against the state government frustrated some of its member-organizations. The focus on the World Bank was clearly a strategy borrowed from the experience with the MDB Campaign of some of the Forum's founding members, research and advocacy NGOs such as IEA and IPHAE. Other groups within the Forum resented the fact that the Forum did not search for more local avenues to voice its criticisms to Planaflores²⁵ and did not engage in selected – and pragmatic – negotiations with governmental agencies aiming at accomplishing some of Planaflores's goals. The later was the preferred strategy of some of Planaflores beneficiaries and their organizations, who saw in the project their only chance of gaining access to concrete resources. To illustrate, in 1994, without formally leaving the Rondônia Forum, the leadership of the Rondonian rubber-tappers organization, OSR, began to negotiate independently with the colonization institute (INCRA) the creation of extractive reserves in the state.²⁶

The contents of a June 15, 1994 letter from the Rondônia Forum to the World Bank suggest that the Forum's leading organizations and their international allies did not fully evaluate the extent of the cleavages that divided both the Forum and the Planaflores EPIN. The letter demanded the immediate interruption of disbursements for Planaflores due to the project's poor implementation of its environmental component.²⁷ The request caused a furor of action from the part of Planaflores's World Bank officials (who sent monitoring missions to Rondônia, letters to Brazilian authorities, and drafted an *Aide Memoire* formalizing once again the Rondônia's government commitment to the implementation of environmental provisions). From the part of many Rondonian grassroots groups, however, the request for Planaflores's interruption was a "strategic error," as defined by Luis R. de Oliveira, the Forum's Executive Secretary between 1995-6.²⁸ Under pressure by the rubber-tappers' organization and others, the Forum soon withdrew its request for the project's interruption and actually participated in the World Bank – Rondonian government negotiations to bring Planaflores's implementation back on schedule. If the request for the interruption of Planaflores's disbursements increased the stress on the Rondônia Forum's coalition, the decision to retract and negotiate frustrated international environmental NGOs that had supported the initiative.²⁹ The latter perceived the move as a "lost opportunity" to finally make both the Bank and the Rondonian government accountable to Planaflores's environmental goals. Working relations between the Forum and its international allies only resumed in 1995.

The Rondônia Forum's internal cleavages were finally overcome by mid-1995, and like a phoenix, the organization emerged from the ashes of its 1994 legitimacy conflicts to lead the pressures for restructuring the Planaflores project. Two factors contributed to erase tensions among the Forum's members. On the one hand, unity was important to counteract a political backlash against Planaflores that came, unexpectedly, from within the government's ranks. The 1995 incoming administration of Valdir Raupp opposed the project on the grounds that it was an obstacle to Rondônia's development. A possible cancellation of the project by Raupp would shatter any chance for beneficiaries to have even minor gains from it. On the other hand, the Forum's legitimacy crisis forced an internal reassessment of the organization's identity and mission that resulted in an increased degree of accountability to Rondonian grassroots organizations in general and to those representing Planaflores's beneficiaries in particular (rubber-tappers, indigenous peoples, small farmers, and riverine populations). In fact, the Forum's increased accountability to Rondonian grassroots organizations was a natural development of the evolution of its membership base. Table 1 shows that between 1991, when the Forum was created, and 1995, its membership changed considerably. While in 1991, "brokerage" organizations, i.e., advocacy and support NGOs, constituted the large majority of the Forum's affiliated organizations (9), and only 2 entities represented grassroots groups, in 1995, advocacy organizations constituted less than half of the Forum's members, while the number of grassroots organizations had increased by 100%. This tendency towards attracting grassroots organization has intensified, and in 2000 these organizations composed two-thirds of the Forum's membership base.

Table 1: Membership in the Rondônia Forum by Year

YEAR	ADVOCACY/SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS*	GRASSROOTS ORGANIZATIONS**	RONDÔNIA FORUM's TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
1991	9	2	11
1992	11	6	17
1995	12	13	25
2000	11	21	32

*Defined as organizations that provide material, technical, and political support to grassroots groups but are not identified by the “rank and file” of such groups as co-participants in their way of life and struggles, or as their representatives. They are usually professionally organized, i.e., have formal headquarters, communication resources, and paid staff. Examples in Rondônia are ECOPORE and PACA.

**Defined as organizations that represent a segment of the population that shares similar interests and/or life conditions. Grassroots organizations may or may not have formal headquarters and paid staff. Examples in Rondônia are the OSR and FETAGRO.

SOURCES: *Protocolo de Entendimento ONGs – Governo de Rondônia*, June 20, 1991, *Carta Aberta* (from the Rondônia Forum to the World Bank Executive Directors), March 12, 1992; Letter to Fernando Collor de Mello, President of Brazil, May 29, 1992, Request for Inspection, submitted to the World Bank Inspection Panel on the Planaflo, July 25, 1995, and *Forum das ONGs de Rondônia* (institutional brochure), May 2000.

The Rondônia Forum’s 1995 reassessment of its role vis-a-vis the Planaflo project challenges claims such as Keck’s (1998), that Rondonian civil society groups are simply brokerage actors, rather than organizations representative of sectors of Rondônia’s population. Rather than a mistaken analysis, Keck’s is representative of a period in the evolution of Rondonian civil society groups. What is striking is the speed of the change in the nature and composition of civil society organizations in the state, and consequently, of their political strength, a topic that is detailed below.

Political and institutional difficulties plagued the implementation of the Planaflo project from its inception. Despite initial expectations, they were hardly overcome by the Planaflo EPIN. The network’s political, symbolic, and material resources, and its well crafted strategies, were hindered not only by the nature of Rondônia’s local politics and the World Bank’s lack of accountability, but also by the EPIN’s own incapacity to unite its members in a common approach to ESD and to the strategies to pursue it in the context of the Planaflo project.

Grassroots Participation in Rondônia and the Restructuring of the Planaflo Project (1995-2000): Common Ground at Last?

The paragraphs below will tell a story very different from the one told above. It is a story of seized opportunities, of pragmatism, and of placing the goals of ESD within the larger context of local political and economic participation. The main characters in this story are Rondonian local groups and grassroots organizations, although international NGOs, Brazilian advocacy and research institutes, Brazilian and foreign independent consultants, and selected World Bank officials remained important players. Between 1995 and 2000 the members of the Planaflo EPIN developed two main strategies to affect the implementation of the project’s environmental provisions. On the one hand, drawing from their accumulated experience in pressuring the World Bank, EPIN members brought the Planaflo to the scrutiny of the Inspection Panel.³⁰ On the other, The Rondônia Forum responded to grassroots demands for the “localization” of pressures and engaged in a formal dialogue with governmental agencies that led to the formulation of the Program for the Support of Community Initiatives, PAIC.

These two strategies reflected the consolidation, among the Planaflo EPIN members, of a new approach to ESD. This new approach embraced the expectations of Planaflo’s beneficiaries that the project would eventually benefit them materially.³¹ Without rejecting the conservationist goals that guided the EPIN’s actions in the early 1990s, Rondonian organizations rejected their preeminence in the network’s agenda. Limiting deforestation and demarcating indigenous and rubber-tappers’ reserves and conservation units were to be parts of a larger grassroots empowerment process. As such, ESD in the context of Planaflo, as framed by the Rondônia Forum and its affiliate organizations, is a process by which the *project’s*

beneficiaries themselves define their development priorities aiming at the improvement of their quality of life in economic, political, and environmental terms.³²

As I will show below, the role played by the Rondônia Forum and its member organizations in the Inspection Panel claim, in the subsequent Planaflo restructuring process, and in the elaboration of the PAIC greatly affected the structure and dynamic of the Planaflo EPIN. Clearly, the Rondônia Forum succeeded in establishing itself as the catalyst organization for the network's initiatives. In 1996, more than ever before, the Forum was a reference for Rondônia's grassroots groups as well as for local, national, and international NGOs. In terms of its composition, the Planaflo EPIN experienced the distancing of some of its international supporters, while strengthening ties with national advocacy and research organizations (IBASE, PACS) and with selected World Bank officials and consultants.

The Inspection Panel claim and the empowerment of Rondonian civil society groups

Advised by the Brazilian offices of international NGOs, such as Friends of the Earth and Oxfam, the Rondônia Forum seized the opportunity to address the frustration of its constituency by presenting a request for inspection of the Planaflo project to the World Bank Inspection Panel, in June 17, 1995. The Inspection Panel claim was, possibly, the most powerful and successful strategy implemented by the Planaflo EPIN to date for several reasons. First, the Panel had just been established and its effectiveness was under close scrutiny from the part of the international environmental and human rights movements. Addressing the Panel meant the possibility of refocusing the attention of the national and international media back to Rondônia.³³ Second, the claim was a new strategy available to the Planaflo EPIN, in a moment when other strategies (letters, negotiations, follow-up agreements) had become ineffective.³⁴ Third, the mobilization, research, and consultation processes that preceded the formalization of the claim re-unified groups within and outside Rondônia. This new degree of internal cohesion contributed to increase the political space and political power of Rondonian civil society groups vis-à-vis the local government.³⁵

The impact of the Inspection Panel claim on the "re-mobilization" of the Planaflo EPIN merits a closer look. In fact, the idea of addressing the Panel, as well as most of the research and writing of the 56-page long document forwarded to the Panel was done by Brent Millikan, consultant for the Rondônia Forum and Roberto Smeraldi, coordinator of Friends of the Earth-Brazilian Amazonia, with the collaboration of staff members of Oxfam and the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL). Since individuals and organizations linked to the international environmental movement initiated the Planaflo EPIN's Inspection Panel strategy, it was initially perceived by some analysts as an "imposition" to the Rondonian groups.³⁶ Yet, as the process unfolded, it became clear that the Rondônia Forum and the totality of its constituency had fully embraced the claim strategy.³⁷ It is interesting to note the nuances that distinguish the 1994 request for interruption of disbursements for Planaflo, from the 1995 request for the investigation of the project by the Inspection Panel. Both strategies were inspired and supported by the Planaflo EPIN's international members and Rondonian groups closely attuned to them. In 1994, however, Planaflo beneficiaries still hoped to gain something from the project and felt betrayed when their representatives and/or allies in the Planaflo EPIN moved to interrupt the project. By 1995, however, these populations had lost any hope to benefit from Planaflo if circumstances were unchanged. They were ready to endorse strategies to force the government to deliver on the Planaflo's promises, even if these strategies could potentially lead to the project's interruption.³⁸ The interruption of Planaflo was a possibility, had the Panel's investigation gone forward, but the real objective of all members of the Planaflo EPIN was for the claim and subsequent investigation to become instruments for the correct and expedite implementation of the project.³⁹

The impact of the Inspection Panel claim on Rondônia's natural and political environments was significant. Even before the Inspection Panel had evaluated the claim and recommended the investigation of Planaflo, the Rondônia government responded to two of the most important demands of the Planaflo EPIN since its inception. It negotiated an agreement between the colonization institute and the

state's land agency, whereby the first transferred public lands to the state. This was a key step in permanently halting the institute's free reign in promoting colonization projects in Rondônia. It also was a pre-condition to expedite the state's ability to create extractive reserves and conservation units. The second important demand that was met after the presentation of the Inspection Panel claim was the immediate creation of 15 extractive reserves. Finally, by December, 1995, the geographic boundaries of the majority of Rondônia's Indigenous areas had been physically delimited.⁴⁰

For Rondônia's political environment, the consequences of the Inspection Panel claim strategy were even more striking. As oblivious to Planaflo as the new Rondonian administration intended to be, it became quickly aware of the level of political visibility that the Inspection Panel claim strategy had lent to the Rondônia Forum, both inside and outside Rondônia.⁴¹ Three days after the claim was delivered to the Inspection Panel, the World Bank director for the Latin American and the Caribbean division arrived at Rondônia to make a personal assessment of the Planaflo irregularities denounced by the Rondônia Forum (after a claim is received by the Panel, World Bank staff must respond to its charges). Fact-finding missions from the Inspection Panel and the Bank's Executive Directors followed.⁴² In addition, the Rondonian governor had to cope with the pressures from the Brazilian federal government who, given its concerns with national sovereignty issues, preferred to see the Planaflo cancelled rather than investigated. The pressures from the federal government were taken seriously by the Raupp administration, since the cancellation of Planaflo would lead to the paralysis of all new loan negotiations for the state.⁴³ Finally, Governor Raupp himself was sensitive to the fact that the Forum's Inspection Panel strategy was supported by several groups that had political links with the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (The Worker's Party). Raupp was elected in runoff elections, after receiving the endorsement of that party. The support of the Worker's Party was clearly important for the new governor, who allocated to it two key secretariats, planning and agriculture. The fact that movements and associations, such as the landless movement and the Rondônia's federation of agricultural workers, FETAGRO, who have been historically associated to the Workers' Party, signed the Inspection Panel claim, indicated to Raupp that Planaflo's poor implementation was contributing to the erosion of his political support.

The Rondônia Forum's ability to increase its membership base during the years preceding the Inspection Panel claim, the internal cohesion that it obtained during the process of preparing the claim, and the strength of its national and international coalitions contributed to the Forum's conquest of an important political space in Rondônia. The Forum's new political strength can be measured by the intensity of its continued struggle for Planaflo's effective implementation, even after the World Bank's Board of Directors refused to approve a formal investigation of the project.⁴⁴ The most striking indication of the political strength obtained by the Rondônia Forum and its member organizations in the wake of the Inspection Panel claim is provided by the role they played in the process of restructuring the Planaflo project, which unfolded between June and September, 1996.

An independent mid-term evaluation of the Planaflo project was a long-standing demand of Rondonian civil society organizations. It was finally commissioned in the beginning of 1996, providing a common agenda for the World Bank-sponsored Planaflo Evaluation Seminar, (Rondônia, June 19-20, 1996). The opportunity for a dialogue among the project's stakeholders was particularly valued by World Bank officials, according to whom part of Planaflo's implementation problems were related to the level of confrontation that existed between the Rondonian civil society and the state government.⁴⁵ Representatives of all Planaflo's stakeholders participated in the Seminar -- federal and state governments, Rondonian NGOs and social movements, national and international NGOs, the Rondonian private sector, and the World Bank. The meeting began in a tense atmosphere.⁴⁶ Yet, the Rondonian civil society groups seemed to have the upper hand, since the mid-term evaluation had highlighted many of the same problems already spelled out in the Forum's document to the Inspection Panel. In addition, the mid-term evaluation had indicated the relative success of a small sub-component of Planaflo, the community initiative projects (PIC) and suggested that it be expanded. The Rondonian groups wholeheartedly embraced this suggestion, and were supported by the World Bank. The latter had already perceived the

need to radically restructure budget allocation in Planaflo, even before the start of the Seminar.⁴⁷ After some resistance, the Rondonian Secretary of Planning, Emerson Teixeira, suggested that the Seminar be interrupted while the government and civil society representatives discussed how to re-allocate Planaflo's remaining funds. The Rondonian civil society groups insisted that the project be streamlined, which meant the exclusion of several governmental bureaucracies. Funds initially allocated to these agencies should be channeled to a community initiative fund, which eventually became the PAIC. The World Bank's task manager for Planaflo explains the political importance of the PAIC as being a "mid-way" solution to the power struggle between Rondônia's government and civil society. The first was extremely reluctant to lose any fraction of power over the project, which was an inevitable consequence of the exclusion of several state agencies from it. The latter perceived the restructuring process as an opportunity to obtain real power and political space within Planaflo. In the end, civil society organizations got the PAIC while the government kept the project under its control.⁴⁸ The Planaflo restructuring implied a reduction of project components to four areas: the PAIC itself, environmental conservation, road pavement and river transportation.⁴⁹

The one real innovation of the Planaflo's restructuring process is the PAIC. All other components were simply re-arranged and re-named, with minimal budget changes.⁵⁰ The PAIC received US\$ 20,000,000 (twenty million dollars, which represents 12% of the World Bank's total funding for Planaflo). This amount, however, grows in significance, when placed in the context of the 1996 negotiations. At the time, the main issue was not to re-allocate Planaflo's entire budget, but to try to make the best possible use of its remaining funds (US\$ 72,000,000). Under this perspective, the PAIC meant that the Rondonian grassroots groups gained direct access to 28% of Planaflo's remaining funds.

The Planaflo Evaluation Seminar ended in an atmosphere much more cheerful than it had started. John Garrison, the World Bank NGO Liaison with Civil Society, recalls that himself, Millikan (consultant for the Rondônia Forum), and the representatives of Oxfam and Friends of the Earth wrote together a press release. In it, they defined the agreement between Rondônia's government and civil society as establishing a historical precedent, and stated their belief in its success.⁵¹ For the representatives of the Rondônia civil society, the PAIC represented a "more effective participation of the civil society in the management of public money."⁵² It was also a major step forward in the quest of the Rondonian civil society for political space.⁵³ Finally, Rondonian grassroots groups had major expectations regarding the PAIC,⁵⁴ and saw it as one of the best features of the Planaflo project.⁵⁵

The PAIC, Environmentally Sustainable Development, and Grassroots Empowerment – The Struggle Lives On

A team composed of state and federal government officials and representatives of the Rondônia Forum completed the PAIC guidelines in September, 1996. The PAIC's *Manual of Operation* describes the program's general objectives in the following way:

"...to fund and implement projects conceived from the perspective of the needs, initiatives, and priorities as defined by the beneficiary communities themselves, aiming at the improvement of their quality of life, employment opportunities, income, technology and production, strengthening of their citizenship, social organization, participation, self-management, and environmental conservation, in line with the Planaflo's objectives (page 5, author's translation)."

As the reader can see, environmental issues *per se* are not first among the PAIC's priorities, the improvement of beneficiaries' quality of life is. Yet, a closer analysis of the program clearly indicates that environmental conservation is an intrinsic part of a satisfactory quality of life. The initiative is conceived as a vehicle for the consolidation of Planaflo's environmental goals, and a tool in the process of raising the environmental consciousness of its beneficiary populations. Among the PAIC's seven criteria of

eligibility, three address environmental issues: projects cannot promote deforestation or generate any other negative environmental impact; projects must include specific environmentally-related initiatives and allocate budget for them; and, although only grassroots organizations, such as associations and federations, cooperatives, and unions, may present proposals to the PAIC, an exception is made for environmental NGOs and those supporting indigenous peoples. Finally, the PAIC's criteria for counterpart funds also aimed at benefiting environmental initiatives. The PAIC provides grants of up to R\$ 150,000 (approximately US\$ 80,000). The beneficiary community must provide twenty percent (20%) of counterpart funds for productive, social, and infrastructure activities, but in the case of environmental initiatives, counterpart requirements decrease to ten percent (10%). To avoid the dispersion of PAIC's activities, and promote the principle of socio-economic and environmental integration, the program selected seven priority areas, namely, conservation units, Indigenous lands, rubber-tapper reserves, and their surrounding areas (*áreas de entorno*).⁵⁶

The PAIC design still determines that Rondonian civil society organizations have direct access to the PAIC's decisionmaking processes on two levels. They participate in the PAIC's working groups for the analysis, selection, and monitoring of projects, and in the PAIC's Deliberative Council (*Conselho Deliberativo*, CD-PAIC), which decides about strategic issues related to the program. The composition of both the working groups and the CD allows for parity in the number of seats allocated to government officials and representatives of the civil society.⁵⁷ On another level, once a project is approved, the proposing entity has access to funds through a joint account, established under its name (or that of its representative), and of the Planaflo's Executive Secretary.

Despite the PAIC's detailed provisions regarding the environment, some observers argue that it has become merely another vehicle for the state's (and some beneficiary groups') developmentalist agenda. Millikan (1998) states that the PAIC deviated attention and resources away from the effort of implementing Planaflo's environmental conditions. In the perception of World Bank staff and consultants, their effort to introduce the environmental variable in the PAIC and make it a priority was met with resistance by the Rondônia Forum's organizations and the government's technical personnel. Resistance manifested itself at different levels, from the sheer lack of interest, to a lack of understanding on how to elaborate a project that integrated, rather than segmented, environmental and productive actions.⁵⁸ It is no surprise then that Rondonian governmental officials and the staff of the Brazilian chapters of international environmental NGOs share the perception that the environmental variable was, to a certain extent, "forced upon" the PAIC by the World Bank.⁵⁹ Yet, in the eyes of the representatives of the Rondonian civil society organizations, the opportunity to use the PAIC as an instrument to promote the environmental sustainable development of the state was always a priority, although not the only or primary one.⁶⁰

A closer look at the conflicting perceptions on the level of environmental commitment of Rondônia's civil society shows that they differ more as a matter of intensity than of substance. World Bank officials and international environmental NGOs saw a "green" PAIC as a key opportunity to establish a new model of sustainable development for the Amazon region. The expectation of local organizations regarding the PAIC, however, was more modest. They looked at the initiative as a tool in the process of improving their quality of life (politically, through participation, and economically, through the development of productive activities). Environmental protection was thus an inherent *consequence* of the larger process of community development. In other words, while some perceived environmental protection within the PAIC as a goal in itself, Rondonian civil society organizations perceived it as a natural consequence of successful community development. For instance, Ferreira, representative of the indigenous peoples' organization CUNPIR, explains that "...we have always pushed for (environmental) sustainable development within the PAIC. Obviously, sustainable development relates to all aspects of a community's life, but it is important to stress that the PAIC should provide incentives to family-based productive activities... The expectation was that, by obtaining economic sustainability, (indigenous peoples) would cease to sell wood and to allow mining in their lands."⁶¹ The link between economic productivity and environmental protection has also become clear among small farmers. Abreu (President

of Rondônia's Federation of Agricultural Workers, FETAGRO) describes his experience in a public audience about the second approximation of the zoning process: "I explained that last year, water had dried out in my plot of land. The only thing that could explain it was that my neighbor and myself had deforested around the head of the stream. Both the forest engineer and the geologist who were at the audience confirmed that the lack of water was a consequence of us cutting the trees. People easily understood the problem."⁶²

The PAIC's implementation problems undermined the program's environmental mission, and thus may have contributed to shape perceptions on the Rondonian civil society's limited commitment to environmental protection. Implementation challenges derived from two sources, the state government's lack of "ownership" of the PAIC and the low technical capacity of Rondonian civil society organizations. From its inception, PAIC projects were plagued by excessive bureaucratic requirements. The application process, for instance, mandated that beneficiaries' organizations presented several permits. These were frequently outdated by the time the proposal was evaluated by the PAIC's working groups. The proposal was then rejected and the communities had to re-apply for the permits, pay the necessary fees, and hope for a timely re-evaluation of their application. Once projects were approved, the government systematically delayed the transferring of funds. This often created insurmountable operational problems for the beneficiaries. For instance, because of the delay in transferring funds to an indigenous association, it became impossible to purchase the Toyota truck (whose price had risen since the initial budget was elaborated). The truck was a central piece of the project and in order for the community to be able to afford it, the project had to be reformulated, penalizing the environmental variable. In the case of a large number of small farmers' associations, the consequence of delays in obtaining funds from the PAIC was even more serious. The complete disregard of the government/Planafloro bureaucracy for the agricultural calendar (planting season, rainy season, etc.) made the implementation of several projects completely impossible. Many of these projects were committed to agroforestry systems or had a reforestation subcomponent, but these environmentally-friendly initiatives were lost once the projects were paralyzed due to the lack/delay of funds.

The delay in transferring funds to the beneficiary communities was not a new problem. Even before the PAIC was formulated, evaluations of its predecessor (the Project of Community Initiatives, PIC) warned about that risk.⁶³ But the most serious challenge related to funds disbursements in the PAIC occurred at the end of 1998. As a strategy to increase his chances of being re-elected, Governor Raupp diverted funds earmarked for the PAIC and channeled them to the payment of public employees' salaries. The scheme had far more harmful consequences than those of previous delays since many associations had already been notified that funds were deposited in their respective PAIC joint accounts. Assuming that funds were guaranteed, associations ordered supplies and formalized service contracts. Only when immediate payments were due was that they realized their bank accounts were empty. Rondonian civil society representatives describe the impact of the government's "betrayal" in the following words: *"...people were in real trouble, a leader of one association committed suicide, other groups had to organize raffle schemes to cover their expenses..." (interview with Ferreira, 2000);*

"the small farmers, who had ordered seeds and plants (were very affected). Several associations of small farmers are being sued by suppliers who have not been paid...The delay in transferring funds is harming the rubber-tappers' PAIC that aimed at building infrastructure for eco-tourism in the entire state. We (the rubber-tappers) expected to have it in place a year ago. In June we will host groups of international tourists and our infrastructure is limited to a small hut, built by the community itself..." (interview with Santos, 2000).

While the crisis generated by Raupp's maneuver failed to reelect him, it succeeded in paralyzing the PAIC for the entire year of 1999. It also threatened the credibility of Planafloro, and most importantly, of the Rondonian civil society organizations that had supported the PAIC from its inception.

The lack of capacity of Rondonian civil society organizations in meeting their PAIC obligations also affected their credibility. On the one hand, the Rondônia Forum and other NGOs and grassroots peak organizations that assumed technical functions in the PAIC administrative bodies were overwhelmed by the amount of work that evaluating, selecting, and monitoring proposals and projects entailed. In addition to the lack of technical knowledge in these areas, the Rondonian groups were plagued by a shortage of human resources. On the other hand, beneficiary associations lacked the basic training and experience in accounting and financial matters required to meet the PAIC's criteria. Inaccurate financial reports, billing statements, and budget estimates as well as a sheer lack of capacity to effectively utilize the amount of funds received have contributed to the delay of disbursements and the overall approval of projects.⁶⁴

The paragraphs above provided a summary of the conceptual and practical challenges that the PAIC has faced to fulfill its environmental mission. They also shed light on the level of environmental commitment of Rondonian civil society organizations vis-à-vis the PAIC and explain why such a commitment sometimes appeared to be ignored or underplayed in the course of the program's implementation. Before closing this section, however, it is important to analyze the PAIC's actual and potential contribution to Rondônia's ESD.

The PAIC's contribution to Rondônia's ESD

The PAIC's contribution to Rondônia's ESD has unfolded on three levels. First, the program has created concrete opportunities – though not always fulfilled -- for grassroots communities to formulate their own definition of community development with a sound environmental basis. Second, it has consolidated a process of environmental awareness among populations previously unconcerned with the issue (namely, small farmers). Third, in becoming a symbol of the political strength of the Rondonian civil society organizations, the PAIC -- and the Planafloresta restructuring as a whole – has created new arenas for cooperation and dialogue between the government and civil society groups on environmental and development policies.

Although the PAIC has not been completed (the program should continue until the end of 2001), consultant reports and interviews indicate that its emphasis on “productive” activities has not prevented it from contributing to Rondônia's ESD⁶⁵ (although still on a lesser degree than it was originally anticipated). Most importantly, however, the PAIC is already a valid example of a community development initiative that has not threatened the environment.⁶⁶ Browder (1998) points out that the apparent dichotomy between environmental and productive activities may be misleading when one evaluates the PAIC's environmental performance. He cites the examples of activities such as apiculture and pisciculture that may be classified as either “environmental” or “productive,” depending on the context, “while other activities that may deliver a strong long-term benefit for environmental conservation (e.g., the recuperation of degraded areas with agroforestry planting) are classified as productive.” The consultant concludes that “many activities and project inputs financed by PAIC that are classified as “productive,” “infrastructure” or “social” are likely to be used by community organizations in ways that promote the environmental conservation goals of Planafloresta.”⁶⁷

The PAIC's contribution to raising the level of environmental awareness among Rondônia's grassroots groups, in particular among small farmers, may in the long term, become the program's major legacy.⁶⁸ The role played by key members of the Planafloresta EPIN in this process, such as the Rondônia Forum, the federation of agricultural workers, FETAGRO, and the environmental NGO ECOPORÉ, supported by international NGOs with offices in Brazil, such as WWF and Oxfam, is undeniable. Several strategies have been used by these organizations to promote the environmental education of Rondonian grassroots groups. In interview with this author, the President of FETAGRO cited the inclusion of the theme in the event “*Grito da Terra*,” (“Cry of the Land”), organized yearly by FETAGRO and the landless movement, MST, to discuss issues related to access to land, commercialization of products, and organization of small farmers' cooperatives. He also mentioned a FETAGRO/ ECOPORÉ campaign to promote the value of forest reserves among small farmers, which was to be inaugurated during the “Environmental Week,”

promoted by the Rondônia Forum in June 2000. In addition to these specific events, the FETAGRO has assumed the responsibility of initiating discussions on environmental issues among its rank-and-file through the promotion of small meetings in the interior of the state. Anselmo Abreu, President of FETAGRO, however, stresses that there are some differences between environmentalists' and small farmers' perspectives on the environment: "...while environmentalists discuss the issue with an emphasis on the animals, which is correct, we must, in order to convince our bases, address the environmental question from the perspective of the survival of family-based agriculture in Rondônia."

It is interesting to note that FETAGRO has been one of the main forces behind the Rondônia Forum's renewed effort to keep the PAIC focused on its environmental mission. Since the end of 1999, Rondonian civil society organizations have organized several initiatives to pressure the state government to pay its debt to the PAIC and re-initiate the program.⁶⁹ While the new state administration initially ignored the Planafloro and the PAIC, it has recently perceived the potential for political gains that the PAIC entails.⁷⁰ In the eyes of Rondonian civil society groups, the new governor intends to use the PAIC to foster his agenda for the agroindustrialization of the state. This has been strongly opposed by the Rondônia Forum, which is committed to preserving the PAIC's social and environmental mission.⁷¹ Within the Forum, FETAGRO has been the main voice pushing the other organizations to confront the government's attempt to shift the program's emphasis.

The PAIC's final contribution to Rondônia's ESD refers to it having become a symbol of the political strength of Rondônia's civil society. The increased political space that the Rondonian civil society obtained during the formulation of the PAIC and the Planafloro's restructuring process has had concrete effects beyond the scope of the PAIC itself. For instance, civil society's participation has increased in the second approximation of the zoning (SAZ) process through educational workshops promoted by the Rondônia Forum and grassroots groups' attendance to public audiences about the SAZ. The increased political space and visibility of Rondonian organizations has given them more clout vis-à-vis certain governmental agencies. As a result opportunities for dialogue and cooperation have multiplied. For instance, FETAGRO has cooperated with the agency for technical assistance and rural development, EMATER, in agroforestry projects, CUNPIR has advised state and federal health agencies on indigenous peoples' priorities, and the cooperation between Rondônia's rubber-tappers' organization, OSR, and the state secretariat for the environment, SEDAM, has led to the establishment of infrastructure in the majority of Rondônia's extractive reserves.

Conclusions

The Planafloro project, designed by World Bank staff and Brazilian/Rondonian government officials, with input from a network of international and Brazilian environmental and human rights NGOs and activists, represented, at least on paper, an ambitious and comprehensive effort to manage Rondônia's natural resources. From the project's inception, however, this goal proved to be an elusive one. Several factors accounted for such an outcome, not the least the difficulties in formulating a consensual approach to ESD that truly reflected the views of the Planafloro EPIN's local membership base.

A variety of approaches to ESD in the context of the Planafloro project predominated at different junctures of the Planafloro EPIN's mobilization. At the EPIN's inception, the predominant approach to ESD was "conservationist" and emphasized to distinct goals: the protection of ecological "sanctuaries" (indigenous areas, forest reserves, and extractive reserves) and participation (consultation and co-management) of affected communities. This approach was clearly influenced by the EPIN catalysts' international environmental NGOs experience in monitoring the Polonoroeste project. The EPIN's local membership base, while endorsing such an approach, had a different set of priorities and expectations vis-à-vis the Planafloro project than those of its international partners.

As Rondonian civil society groups matured and became more politically experienced, their influence within the Planafloro EPIN grew. In fact, this was a dialectical process in which the Rondonian groups,

by gaining influence within the Planaflo EPIN, also gained political leverage vis-à-vis the Rondônia government. The inverse process also occurred, i.e., as the Rondonian groups increased their political leverage and visibility in the state, they gained preeminence within the Planaflo EPIN. At this juncture, one clearly observes a shift in the Planaflo EPIN's approach to ESD. Through the actions of the Rondônia Forum and its affiliated institutions and supporters in the process of restructuring the Planaflo project, Rondônia's ESD is defined strictly in terms of local realities. The PAIC becomes the concrete expression of the Rondonian civil society's vision for the state's environmentally sustainable development.

Still, a consensual approach within the Planaflo EPIN regarding the environmental role of the PAIC has remained elusive. World Bank staff committed to Planaflo's environmental goals have resented the PAIC's emphasis on productive projects, which they see as contradictory to the PAIC's "green" agenda. To a certain extent, this vision is shared by some of the international environmental NGOs that once actively participated in the Planaflo EPIN. They attribute the PAIC's implementation failures among other things, to the local organizations' lack of capacity regarding environmental issues and lack of commitment to these issues. Finally, staff in Brazilian NGOs and in the national chapters of international environmental NGOs recognize the political importance of the PAIC and concede that the experience may have some residual contribution to Rondônia's ESD. Yet, they remain skeptical of the Planaflo project's overall environmental legacy and of the capacity of local groups to affect this outcome.

For the Rondônia civil society groups, however, their commitment to Rondônia's ESD is intrinsically linked to their experience with the Planaflo project (and their participation in the Planaflo EPIN). They do see the PAIC as an adequate representation of their goals for the ESD of Rondônia, since these goals remain intrinsically linked to – even dependent upon – beneficiaries' political and economic empowerment. The approach to ESD of Rondonian civil society groups may be a controversial one, but it certainly offers important insights to the dilemma of development vs. environmental protection in Amazônia and beyond. Unfortunately, the value of such insights have been compromised by the PAIC's implementation problems.

The question that remains unanswered in this paper is a counterfactual one: how would the Planaflo EPIN's effectiveness in promoting Rondônia's ESD be affected if the approach to ESD proposed by the Rondônia's grassroots groups had been fully embraced by the remaining members of the network from its inception? Or in other words, to what extent are the larger players in the world of global environmental management willing or able to accept grassroots' approaches to ESD, particularly when such approaches may depart from dominant perspectives? What this research stresses, however, is that the meaning of ESD and the strategies to pursue it are contentious issues even among those who are committed to the ideal of environmental protection. This study also points to the importance of establishing bridges among environmentally-concerned actors that may lead to common approaches to the definition and implementation of ESD initiatives in local and regional contexts.

Finally, further research is needed to evaluate the extent to which the approach to ESD, formulated and implemented by Rondônia's grassroots groups, can, in fact, contribute to the state's environmentally-sound development. It is not farfetched to assume that these communities' emphasis on the economic and political aspects of their concept of ESD may place environmental priorities on the fringes of what may become standard "developmentalist" efforts. Environmentally concerned individuals and institutions should be prepared to conduct and demand thorough evaluations of the environmental impact of the PAIC and other similar initiatives, such as its twin program, the PADIC, in implementation in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CD-PAIC	Decisionmaking Council for the Program for the Support of Community Initiatives
CPT-RO	Land Pastoral Commission - Rondônia
CNS	National Council for the Rubber-Tappers
CUNPIR	Coordination of the Union of Indigenous Peoples and Nations
DTR-CUT	Department of Agricultural Workers of the Workers' Central
ECOPORE	Ecological Action for the Guaporé Valley
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMATER	Agency for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension
EPIN	Environmental protection Issue Network
ESD	Environmentally Sustainable Development
FETAGRO	Federation of Agricultural Workers of Rondônia
IAMA	Institute for Anthropology and the Environment
IEA	Institute for Amazon Studies
INCRA	Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform
INDIA	Research Institute for the Defense of Amazon Identity
IPHAE	Institute of Pre-History, Anthropology, and Ecology
MST	Landless Movement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NWF	National Wildlife Federation
OSR	Organization of Rubber-Tappers of Rondônia
PACA	Environmental Protection of Cacaoal
PADIC	Program for the Support and Development of Community Initiatives
PAIC	Program for Support of Community Initiatives
PIC	Program of Community Initiatives
PLANAFLORO	Rondônia's Natural Resources Management Program
POLONOROESTE	Northwest Integrated Development Program
SAZ	Second Approximation of the Zoning process
SEDAM	Environmental Secretariat
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNI	Union of Indigenous Nations
USAID	United States Agency for international Development
WWF	World Wildlife Fund for Nature

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¹ The World Bank’s Staff Appraisal Report – Brazil Rondônia Natural Resource Management Project, February 27, 1992, p. 1.

² These measures were part of Planaflores’s first sub-component “Environmental Conservation, Management and Enforcement,” to which approximately one-third of project funds were allocated (US \$ 55.1 million from the World Bank’s US \$ 167 million loan to the Brazilian government, plus the Rondônia government’s counterpart funds). Other project components were agro-forestry development and socio-economic infrastructure and services; see “Loan Agreement, Loan # 3444 BR, Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project, between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,” September 19, 1992).

³ An extensive discussion of the different approaches to the concept of ESD is outside the scope of this paper. For the purposes of this discussion, an actor’s approach to ESD includes both its theoretical/philosophical understanding on how to harmonize the ideals of material improvement and conservation of natural resources and its ideological, political, and material interests in these processes. I use the terms “conservative” and “mainstream” to refer to ESD approaches that tend to segment the notions of economic development and environmental sustainability. Alternative approaches, sometimes labeled “social-environmental development” (IBASE 1995) or “ecologically sound and socially equitable development” (Lélé 1991), attempt to integrate environmental, economic, social and political concerns.

⁴ For the World Bank, the Planaflores was an opportunity to redeem itself from its role in the previous funding of environmentally unsound initiatives in the area. For Rondonian bureaucrats, the project meant an important source of revenue in a moment when the state faced an acute financial crisis. For Rondonian political and economic elites, the Planaflores’s environmental components were mere public relations devices and the project was perceived as a tool to foster their developmentalist agenda. For international NGOs monitoring the project, the Planaflores was an opportunity to “test” the effectiveness of their international lobby to increase the World Bank’s environmental accountability. Finally, for local NGOs and social movements, the Planaflores offered an opportunity to participate in the policymaking process.

⁵ Millikan places the origin of these limitations in the internal fragility of the local coalition of NGOs and social movements, in the coalition’s overvaluation of pressure strategies against the World Bank and disregard for pressure strategies against the local government, in the organizations’ lack of capacity to formulate alternative proposals, which has led them, on occasion, to become rubber-stamp entities for the government’s initiatives, and even in the incapacity of Rondonian organization of addressing issues of representation that sometimes have distanced their bases from their leadership.

⁶ EPINs are networks of environmentally concerned actors that mobilize to promote local environmental protection. EPINs’ members may be organizations (NGOs, churches, labor unions), individuals (scientists, activists), and sectors of the state apparatus, multilateral organizations, and private corporations (for instance, a local environmental agency, the World Bank’s environmental department, or the environmental division of a transnational mining company, respectively). EPINs’ lineage can be traced back to the works of Sikkink and Keck (Sikkink 1993, Keck and Sikkink 1998), on transnational advocacy networks and of Rissen-Kappen (1994) on transnational coalitions. Two main characteristics distinguish EPINs from other transnational advocacy networks: a) their primary concern is to promote local environmental protection (rather than influencing national and global policies), and b) local members tend to have concrete material and/or political motivations to join the network, and thus their

behavior cannot be explained simply as a function of shared values, principled ideas, and intellectual and emotional commitments, which usually determine membership in transnational advocacy networks.

⁷ See Web pages for these organizations, respectively, www.worldbank.org, www.usaid.org, www.wri.org, www.edf.org, and www.foe.org (or www.amazonia.org.br). None of these institutions denies the importance of encouraging grassroots participation in ESD initiatives or the need to improve their economic and social conditions in order to achieve environmental protection. They do, however, perceive environmental protection as the main goal, whereas participation and the improvement of social and economic structures are the means to that goal.

⁸ The Planaflo EPIN was originally composed of international environmental NGOs with a history of supporting environmental protection initiatives in the Brazilian Amazon region, such as Oxfam, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), the Environmental Defense (at the time, the Environmental Defense Fund, EDF), and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF), among others; national environmental and human rights NGOs, such as the *Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos e Ambientais* (Institute for Amazon and Environmental Studies, IEA), the *Instituto de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente* (Institute of Anthropology and the Environment, IAMA), national unions, such as the *Conselho Nacional dos Seringueiros* (National Council of Rubber-Tappers, CSN), local NGOs in Rondônia, who support and help organize specific sectors of the local population, such as the Rondônia's chapters of the *Conselho Indígena Missionário* (Indigenous Peoples' Missionary Council, CIMI), and the *Comissão Pastoral da Terra* (Land Pastoral Commission, CPT); local environmental organizations, such as *Ação Ecológica Vale do Guaporé* (Ecological Action for the Guaporé Valley, ECOPORÉ), *Instituto de Pesquisa em Defesa da Identidade Amazônica* (Research Institute for the Defense of Amazon Identity, INDIA), and the *Instituto de Pré-História, Antropologia e Ecologia* (Institute of Pre-History, Anthropology, and Ecology, IPHAE), as well as the Rondônia's rubber-tappers association, the *Organização dos Seringueiros de Rondônia* (OSR), which had just been formed. In addition to these organizations, the World Bank's environmental department, and the Brazilian Environmental Ministry under the short-termed leadership of a committed Brazilian environmentalist, José Lutzenberger, also participated in the EPIN at different junctions. Finally, the Planaflo EPIN has also counted among its most active members individuals committed to Amazônia's environmental protection, among them, Chico Mendes, a leader of the Brazilian rubber-tappers movement, assassinated in 1988, and Thomas Lovejoy, renown environmental scientist with the Smithsonian Institute. As this paper unfolds, I will describe how the composition of the Planaflo EPIN has changed overtime, with direct consequences for its approach to ESD in Rondônia.

⁹ EPINs' catalysts are actors who initiate mobilization and mediate relations among the various members of a given network. Catalysts usually have access to material and symbolic resources, which they lend to other members of the network, while funding most of the EPIN's initiatives. Catalysts are usually the main designers and promoters of an EPIN's strategies (Rodrigues 2000).

¹⁰ In some cases the same person was interviewed in two separate occasions.

¹¹ The MDB Campaign consisted of coordinated strategies (such as media education, hearings in the US Congress and European Parliament, and lobbying of key decisionmakers – senators, executive directors to the MDBs, and the US Secretary of Treasure), which were implemented by international environmental and human rights NGOs and activists. These actors demanded an increased accountability from the MDBs to their environmental and social policies. For details, see Bramble and Porter (1992), Rich (1985 and 1994).

¹² For instance, IPHAE and IEA in Rondônia, and the *Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Socio-Econômicas*, IBASE, in Rio de Janeiro.

¹³ "Plano Agropecuario e Florestal de Rondônia – Planaflo," Comitê de Avaliação Independente – COMAI, Rondônia, 1993 (mimeo)

¹⁴ The colonization institute intended to create three new settlement projects in Rondônia, namely, Água Azul, Curupira, and Rio do Conto. All were designed without the elaboration of environmental impact assessments, required by law, and all were located in areas designated as "Zone 4," which according to the first phase of the zoning process, was limited to economic activities to the extraction of forest products.

¹⁵ Letters from the Rondônia Forum to the colonization institute's President, May 29, 1992; August 14, 1992; September 8, 1992; February 28, 1993; and April 15, 1993.

¹⁶ Luis Coirolo, World Bank Staff and Polonoroeste's Task Manager and Marcelo de Pádua, staff at the Brazilian Ministry of Regional Integration, interviews with the author, respectively, Washington, D.C., March, 1991 and Brasilia, September 26, 1994.

¹⁷ An EPIN's legitimacy is not exclusively determined by the location of its members (see Rodrigues, 2000). Nevertheless, since its primary concern is the environmental sustainability of a given region, it is extremely important that local affected populations and/or their representatives are fully engaged in framing an EPIN's strategies and demands.

¹⁸ With the support of IPHAE's and IEA's local staff, international NGOs obtained statements from nineteen citizens' organizations from Rondônia indicating that they had not been consulted about the Planaflo project, had

interest in the project, and expected to participate in it (see EDF's letters to World Bank's President from February 22, 1990 and to the Bank's Vice President, Latin American and Caribbean Region, from May 14, 1990).

¹⁹ Twelve organizations signed the agreement, among them the Rondonian chapter of IEA, the Institute for Amazon Studies, the National Union of Indigenous peoples (UNI) and the National Rubber-Tappers' Council (CNS).

²⁰ Interviews with José. C Gadelha, coordinator of CPT-RO, Porto Velho, RO, 11/26/94, and Pádua.

²¹ Interviews with Hélio Madalena, legal advisor for the NGOs' Forum, Porto Velho, RO, 11/23/94, Mauro Leonel, Planafloro's consultant and IAMA's director, São Paulo, 9/12/94; and Pedro Wilson, staff, Secretariat of Agriculture, Porto Velho, RO, 11/25/94.

²² Interviews with Anna M. Avelar, President of INDIA, Porto Velho, RO, 11/24/94 and Aurélio Viana, General Secretary for the Rede Brasil Para Instituições Financeiras Multilaterais (1995-98), Brasília, 5/19/2000.

²³ It is interesting to note that the promises of Planafloro to rubber-tappers were so extensive that by 1994 this group was extremely frustrated, despite being the one set of beneficiaries that could count some gains from the project.

²⁴ Interviews, respectively, 11/25/94 and 11/22/94, Porto Velho, Rondônia.

²⁵ Interview with Ana M. Avelar, President of India, Porto Velho, 11/24/94.

²⁶ Interview with José M. dos Santos, at the time Vice-President of OSR, and today the President of that organization, 11/22/94

²⁷ In interview with John Garrison, NGO Liaison with Civil Society for the World Bank in Brazil, explains the impact of requests for interrupting disbursements for a given project: "When it happens, the entire relation between the World Bank and the borrowing country is affected. It disrupts other initiatives that may be doing well," Brasília, 5/19/2000.

²⁸ Interview with the author, Brasília, 3/21/95

²⁹ Telephone interview with Stephen Schwartzman, EDF's anthropologist, August, 1995.

³⁰ The Inspection Panel was created on August 1, 1994, by the World Bank. It "is empowered to investigate complaints submitted by people directly affected by Bank projects regarding violations of World Bank policies, procedures, and loan agreements." (Udall, 1998, p. 414). The Panel was created as a response to the pressures and proposals implemented by Washington-based NGOs in the context of the MDB Campaign.

³¹ In the conclusion of the "Request for Inspection" of Planafloro by the Inspection Panel, the claimants stress that the investigation "... would greatly contribute to the solution of ongoing problems in the execution of Planafloro" (p. 52).

³² Although this is my own definition of the meaning of ESD for Rondonian civil society groups it is based both on comments from the individuals I interviewed in Rondônia and on the PAIC documents.

³³ Interview with Roberto Smeraldi, Coordinator of Friends of the Earth – Brazilian Amazônia, São Paulo, 6/5/2000.

³⁴ Idem.

³⁵ Interviews with Garrison, Vita, Smeraldi, Viana and Oliveira (Porto Velho, RO, 5/29/2000).

³⁶ Garrison, Oliveira, and Viana explain that the Inspection Panel claim addressed parallel (but not contradictory) agendas. International NGOs and Brazilian think-tanks, for instance, were interested in using Planafloro to test the scope of the Inspection Panel. The Rondonian groups were primarily searching for new instruments to force the World Bank and the state government to effectively implement the project.

³⁷ The representatives of the Rondônia-based organizations interviewed for this research were unanimous in affirming that the claim to the Inspection Panel was a strategy that they fully endorsed and that represented the interests and expectations of their rank and file.

³⁸ Interview with Santos (2000).

³⁹ Interviews with Brent Millikan, consultant for the Rondônia Forum until 1998, Brasília, 5/19/2000 and Schwartzman (1997); and "Notícias do Forum está de Volta" in *Notícias do Forum*, n. 4, year 3, December 1995.

⁴⁰ For details on Planafloro's implementation following the Inspection Panel claim, see: "Letter from the Forum das ONGs e Movimentos Sociais de Rondônia to Ernst-Gunther Broder, Chief, Inspection Panel, October 10, 1995," International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: *Brazil: Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project (Planafloro Project) Report on the Status of Implementation*, December 2, 1996; and Programa Amazônia de Amigos da Terra Internacional, in collaboration with Oxfam: *Planafloro Um Ano Depois*, August, 1997.

⁴¹ The request for the investigation of Planafloro by the Inspection Panel was discussed in several international and Brazilian newspapers, such as the *Financial Times*, London, June 13, 1995, *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Gazeta Mercantil*, and *Folha de São Paulo* ("Cronograma dos fatos," *Notícias do Forum*, n. 4, year 3, December, 1995).

⁴² The missions visited Rondônia, respectively, on August 10-11, 1995 and November 23-25, 1995 ("Cronograma dos Fatos," *Notícias do Forum*, idem).

⁴³ "Banco Mundial tenta evitar a denúncia," *Noticias do Forum*, idem.

⁴⁴ In February 1996, the government of Rondônia issued the decree 7, 341, allowing logging operations in Zone 4 (designated exclusively for extractive reserves). In response, the Forum initiated a Public Civil Action contesting the

decreed, and by April 1996, the courts ordered its suspension. From June to August, a conflict between the government and the Rondonian civil society arose due to the provisions for the second approximation of the zoning law (SAZ), which was a long overdue goal of the Planaflo project. The second approximation would allow for a more detailed assessment of the state's natural resources and the correction of inconsistencies found in the first stage of the zoning process. The government's text of Law 52/96 (which defined the parameters for the second approximation), attempted to restrict the participation of civil society in the process. Alerted by the Forum, World Bank environmental lawyers were able to correct the irregularities of the law. The procedures for the second approximation were finally established in August, 1996.

⁴⁵ Interviews with Vita and Garrison.

⁴⁶ Aparício and Garrison (1999), interviews with Vita, Garrison, and Iremar Ferreira, CUNPIR staff, Porto Velho, RO, 5/23/2000.

⁴⁷ Interviews with Manuel Rego, World Bank staff, Brasília, 5/19/2000, Marta Irving, World Bank's environmental management consultant for Planaflo, Rio de Janeiro, 5/20/2000, and Vita.

⁴⁸ Interview with Vita.

⁴⁹ Aparício and Garrison (1999), World Bank Loan Agreement, Loan number 3444 BR, Brazil – Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project, Amendment 1, December 11, 1997.

⁵⁰ The Table below confirms this point.

Table 2: PLANAFLO's BUDGET ALLOCATION (WORLD BANK FUNDS = US\$ 167 MILLION)

PRE-RESTRUCTURING		POST-RESTRUCTURING	
COMPONENT	AMOUNT (in US\$ million)	COMPONENT	AMOUNT (in US\$ million)
Environment	55 (33%)	Environment	69 (41%)
Agro-forestry & Rural credit	49.2 (29%)	Agro-forestry & Rural credit	20.7 (12%)
Health, education, water	9.2 (5%)	Health, education, water	8.9 (5%)
Road and River Transportation	29.5 (18%)	Road and River Transportation	35.6 (21%)
Administration	8 (5%)	Administration	9.7 (5%)
Unallocated	16 (9%)	Unallocated	3 (1%)
		PAIC	20 (12%)

Source: Loan Agreement (Rondônia Natural Resources Management Project) between Federative Republic of Brazil and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Loan number 3444 BR September 19, 1992 and Amendment 1, of December 11, 1997.

⁵¹ Interview with Garrison.

⁵² "Um Novo Planaflo," in *Notícias do Forum*, n. 8, year 4, July, 1996, p. 1.

⁵³ Interview with Gadelha (2000).

⁵⁴ Interview with Ferreira.

⁵⁵ Interview with Santos (2000).

⁵⁶ Rondônia SEPLAN/Planaflo (1997), pp. 5-7, 13-14, Oliveira (1998).

⁵⁷ According to Renato da Costa Melo, Manager of the PAIC/Planaflo, the current composition of the CD-PAIC is, for the government, representatives of the secretariats of agriculture, environment, education, health, and planning, and of the agency for technical assistance and rural development, EMATER (*Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural*), and the Superintendency of Tourism. The Rondonian civil society is represented by officials from private sector organizations, the Federation of Agricultural Producers of Rondônia (FAERON) and the Federation of Industries of Rondônia (FIERO), and from NGOs and grassroots organizations, namely, the MST, CNS, CUNPIR, CPPT-Cunian (Centro de Pesquisas da Amazônia), and FETAGRO. Interview with the author, Porto Velho, RO, 5/23/2000.

⁵⁸ Interviews with Vita, Garrison, Rego, and Irving.

⁵⁹ Interviews with Melo, Smeraldi, and Luiz C. Pinajé, Staff, Fundo Mundial Para a Natureza (World Wildlife Fund – Brazil), Brasília, 5/26/2000.

⁶⁰ Interviews with Oliveira (2000), Abreu, Santos (2000), Gadelha (2000), and Ferreira.

⁶¹ Interview with Ferreira.

⁶² Interview with Abreu.

⁶³ Jesus (1998).

⁶⁴ Browder (1998), and interviews with Gadelha (2000) and Oliveira (2000).

⁶⁵ Interviews with Melo, Santos (2000), and Gadelha (2000).

⁶⁶ Interview with Garrison.

⁶⁷ Browder (1998), p.14.

⁶⁸ Interview with Abreu. The President of FETAGRO establishes a clear causal relation between Planaflo/PAIC and the opportunities for civil society participation generated by these initiatives, and FETAGRO's increased

environmental awareness. This is corroborated by Pinajé, who singled out FETAGRO as one of the organizations with the highest level of environmental consciousness within Brazil's Confederation of Agricultural Workers (Confederação dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura, CONTAG).

⁶⁹ "Forum das ONGs e Fetagro realizam encontro sobre Planaflo" in *Notícias do Forum*, n. 34, year 7, October, 1999; and "Forum das ONGs e Fetagro cobram recursos dos PAICs" (a report on the Mobilization Day/Action or Citizenship of the PAIC beneficiaries), in *Notícias do Forum*, n. 35, year 7, November/December, 1999.

⁷⁰ Interview with Melo.

⁷¹ Interviews with Ferreira and Abreu.